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MAKING CERTIFICATE OF NEED WORK
MICHAEL K. SCHONBRUNt
Inflation in the last third of this century has become an obsession
of the American polity.' Several factors, now widely accepted as causes
of the country's inflation, have been cited repeatedly by economists,
planners, industrial leaders and politicians in both major parties. Ex-
cessive government spending and over-regulation of business have
been attacked, specifically the alleged high cost of complying with gov-
ernment regulations and the reported stifling of competition and inno-
vation through the bureaucratization of key social and economic
decisions.2 The decline in productivity among American workers has
also been cited,3 while American consumers have been blamed for dis-
playing little self-restraint in their purchasing and credit practices, for
neglecting to take such preventive actions as installing proper home
insulation, and for refusing to utilize efficient but inconvenient meas-
ures such as mass transit.4 Inflation has also been attributed to the
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1. See, e.g., Silk, Infiation: A Showdown Is At Hand, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1979, § 12, at 1.
Silk, writing the lead story for the newspaper's year-end National Economic Survey, quoted Presi-
dent Carter's description of inflation as "'the most complicated and intractable and corrosive
problem of them all.'" Id. at 62.
2. See, e.g., Holsendolph, Deregulation Panacea or Pandora's Box?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1979, § 12, at 28. Holsendolph cites a report by two economists at Washington University in St.
Louis, Murray L. Weidenbaum and Robert DeFina, which found that in 1976 the total annual
cost of federal regulation, including administrative costs and compliance costs, was $66 billion
and predicted that these costs would exceed $103 billion by 1979. Id.
3. Worker productivity increased only 0.4% in 1978--consistent with the generally poor rec-
ord of the last ten years when the productivity rate has risen only 1.6% a year-half the average
annual growth rate in productivity experienced by American workers from 1947 to 1967. Work-
ers' hourly compensation increased by 9.3% during the same period--the largest increase in 27
years. "Because that sharp rise was not offset by a large productivity gain, labor costs for produc-
ing goods and services rose 8.9 percent, the second largest increase ever." Rocky Mountain News,
Jan. 27, 1979, at 76, col. 2.
4. See, e.g., Ettorre, Consumers Pile Up Debt to Buy Homes, Furs, Autos, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1979, § 12, at 10. See also President Carter's speech, The Energy Problem, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 560 (Apr. 25, 1977).
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rapid introduction into our society of gadgetry and technology and the
accompanying advertising campaigns that present new but soon to be
obsolete products in alluring packaging.' Finally, nonprofit institutions
such as universities, community-based charitable collection services
(United Way, Community Chest, etc.), and social welfare agencies
have been hard hit by rising prices and have passed on these higher
costs to their clients and benefactors.'
Many of these same forces operate in the health care sector of the
economy. Indeed, with costs of health care rising 400 percent since
1965, 7 inflation of health care costs has exceeded even that of other
sectors of the economy, leading President Carter to identify the con-
tainment of hospital costs as the leading priority in his administration's
fight against inflation.' Since the advent of Medicare and Medicaid in
1965, government spending for personal health services has increased
from 9.5 to 68.4 billion dollars in 1977-nearly seven fold.9 New gov-
ernment bureaucracies and regulatory programs have burgeoned dur-
ing the past ten years. The lack of price competition among hospitals
has been frequently cited as a chief cause of inflation, together with the
hegemony of the fee-for-service physician who serves as both the gate-
keeper to the entire health care system and as a major economic benefi-
ciary of this highly utilized system."t In addition, because of the now
widely accepted principle that health care is a "right," immediate prox-
imity to a full-service hospital has been widely, if inappropriately, re-
garded by the public as a necessity-thus providing a medical and
quasi-legal rationale for the preexisting American penchant for
convenience. 1
5. See generally J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d ed. 1977).
6. See generally Vladeck, Why Non-Profits Go Broke, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1976,
at 86.
7. Gibson & Fisher, National Health Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1977, SOC. SEC. BULL., July
1978, at 5.
8. See Remarks by President Carter on the Administration's Hospital Cost-Containment
Bill of 1979, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 383 (Mar. 6, 1979); the 1978 year-end interview of
Hamilton Jordan, President Carter's Assistant for Political Affairs, who asserted that the "admin-
istration's biggest disappointments [were] ending 1978 without a peace treaty between Israel and
Egypt and starting 1979 without a law putting a lid on hospital costs." Rocky Mountain News,
Dec. 29, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
9. Gibson & Fisher, supra note 7, at 5.
10. See Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 650 (1978).
See also Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Certificate of Need," 59 VA.
L. REV. 1143, 1155-69 (1973).
11. See, e.g., Louis HARRIS & Assocs., INC., HOSPITAL CARE IN AMERICA (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Louis HARRIS POLL]. When queried whether they would be willing to pay a higher
hospital bill out of their own pocket to keep a specific service in their closest neighborhood hospi-
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Furthermore, for better or worse, the health care system is now
highly dependent on technology. 12 It is a system whose primary insti-
tutions, hospitals, are nonprofit. t3 It is labor intensive, employing over
4.6 million people,' 4 and it represents one of the few sectors in the
American society in which recent labor organizing efforts have been
successful and in which blue-collar workers have enjoyed real salary
improvements in the past decade.' 5 Finally, the health care industry
itself is not only politically well organized with such national lobbying
and trade organizations as the American Medical Association, the
American Hospital Association, and the Blue Cross Association, but its
constituents-most notably doctors, hospital trustees, and insurance
company executives-are often the civic cornerstones of the nation's
communities. Individually as well as collectively, they exercise great
power as local opinion leaders.
It is into this highly inflationary, complex and politically volatile
industry that new regulatory programs such as certificate of need, pro-
spective rate review, and medical peer review (PSROs) have been in-
troduced. These programs are designed to inject considerations of
efficiency, effectiveness and equity into the health care industry. It is
no small order, especially at a time when public mistrust of governmen-
tal programs is high.' 6
The basic premise of the health reformers, champions of these pro-
grams, is that there is substantial waste and inefficiency in the health
system and that, if left alone, the dysfunctions of the system will con-
tal, the respondents said yes to each of the following services: cardiac care unit (76% of respon-
dents), emergency room (73%), kidney machines for renal dialysis (62%), open heart surgery
(59%), cancer therapy (56%), and CAT scanner (53%). Id. at 85.
12. See generally Iglehart, The Cost and Regulation of Medical Technology;" Future Policy Di-
rections, 55 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 25 (1977).
13. In 1976, 89% of the beds and 87% of the country's nonfederal short-term general and
other special hospitals were nonprofit. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION GUIDE TO THE
HEALTH CARE FIELD 7-9 (1977). Based on industry-supplied figures, nonprofit hospitals in some
states are struggling financially. Four out of every five nonprofit hospitals in New York State
sustained an operating loss in 1977. Newsletter of Colorado Chapter, Hospital Financial Manage-
ment Association, February 12, 1979.
14. Television interview with Dr. James Sammon, Executive Vice President of the American
Medical Association, broadcast on Channel 3, New York City (Jan. 20, 1978, 6:30 p.m.).
15. From 1966 to 1975, the average annual rate of increase in earnings for hourly workers in
hospital settings was 8.7%, compared to 5.8% for comparable workers in other non-farm settings.
M. FELDSTEIN & A. TAYLOR, THE RAPID RISE IN HOSPITAL COSTS (Council for Wage and Price
Stability 1977).
16. Louis HARRIS POLL, supra note 11, at 56. The poll showed that 46% of respondents were
opposed to additional government regulation, 38% were in favor, and 16% were not sure. Interest-




tinue unabated.' 7 The reformers hold that the costs of providing good
quality health services can and should be cut back or at least redirected
and controlled. They cite the lack of correlation between per capita
expenditures and health status, the regional differences in hospital
length-of-stay and admission rate per capita, which show little relation-
ship to mortality or morbidity figures, and the notable discrepancies in
per capita expenditure levels and utilization rates between organized
prepaid group practices and the still dominant fee-for-service delivery
system."1
This article will indicate how one of these new regulatory pro-
grams-certificate of need-can be employed to help rationalize the
American health care delivery system. The author recognizes the per-
vasiveness, longevity and multiple origins of the current American in-
flation, the established structural facts about the American health care
system (for example, the continued predominance of the fee-for-service
system), and the prevailing skepticism about governmental regulatory
programs marked, in part, by the recent rebirth of "free market" strate-
gists and "antitrusters."' 9 Consequently, the policy initiatives proposed
here will be compatible with both the realities of the American health
care scene and the current predispositions of the American public and
its political, economic and community leaders. 20
17. See, e.g., Remarks of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., before the National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D.C., October 26, 1978, at 11-15 (U.S. Government Printing Office 1978) (hereinafter
cited as Remarks of Joseph A. Califano].
18. See, e.g., Bunker, Surgical Manpower, 282 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 135 (1970). See also
Getting Readyfor National Health Insurance: Unnecessary Surgery, Hearings Before the Subconut.
on O ersight and In vestigations ofthe Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Repre-
sentatives, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 73-87 (1975) (testimony and statement of John Wennberg); Gaus,
Cooper & Hirschman, Contrasts in HMO andFee-for-Service Per/ormance, SoC. SEC. BULL., May
1976, at 3; Lembcke, Measuring the Quality of Medical Care Through Vital Statistics Based on
Hospital Service Areas: . Comparative Study ofAppendectomy Rates, 42 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 276
(1952).
19. See Iglehart, Adding a Dose of Competition to the Health Care Industry, 10 NAT'L J. 1602
(1978). Iglehart provides a brief historical account of the new interest in the health care sector of
the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, and quotes FTC
Chairman Michael Pertschuk's explanation for his agency's recent activity: "The commission-
like most other agencies of government-was slow to admit that one possible way to control the
seemingly uncontrollable health sector could be to treat it as a business and make it respond to the
same marketplace influences as other American businesses and industries." Id. See generally
Enthoven, supra note 10; Havighurst, supra note 10.
20. See generally Marmor, Wittman & Heagye, Politics, Public Policy, and Medical Inflation,
in HEALTH: A VIcTIM OR CAUSE OF INFLATION (M. Zubkoff ed. 1976); see also Demkovich,
Health Planning 4gencies Face Threat From Deregulators, 11 NAT'L J. 687 (1979); Inglehart, Why
Hospitals Are Waging War on Regulations, 11 NAT'L J. 20 (1979).
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I. THE CERTIFICATE OF NEED MECHANISM
Certificate of need (CON) was first introduced in this country in
1964 in New York, and similar programs are now operating in all states
except Missouri."' Most commentators assert that the primary motiva-
tion for CON enactment in New York and its subsequent passage in
other states was cost containment. The salutory effect of the mecha-
nism on health care inflation occurs, its advocates state, by limiting the
effects of "Roemer's law."2 Roemer postulated that, because of the
lack of price competition, the lack of discriminating consumer behav-
ior, and the pervasiveness of third-party coverage in the health market-
place, a "bed built was a bed filled," regardless of community need,
financial feasibility, or impact on quality of care.23 While highly con-
troversial at the time of its initial pronouncement, Roemer's law is now
widely accepted. By preventing unnecessary capital expenditures, not
only can the cost of the initial construction or acquisition be saved, but
also the accompanying operating expenses. For example, it has been
estimated that the operating cost for every new piece of equipment will
equal the original cost in a period of two to two and one-half years, and
for the CAT scanner, the first-year operating cost alone may equal or
exceed the purchase cost.24
The mechanisms of CON25 vary from state to state. Its fundamen-
21. CHAYET & SONNENREICH, P.C., CERTIFICATE OF NEED: AN EXPANDING REGULATORY
CONCEPT 5-6 (1978).
22. See generally W. MCCLURE, REDUCING ExcEss HOSPITAL CAPACITY (1976); INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONTROLLING THE SUPPLY OF HOSPI-
TAL BEDS 7-16 (1976).
23. Roemer, Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization, HOSPITALS, November 1, 1961, at 36. See
also Wennberg & Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1102
(1973). But see M. FELDSTEIN, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR HEALTH SERVICE EFFICIENCY 201-221
(1968); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SUpra note 22, at 18.
24. Somers & Somers, 4 Proposed Framework for Health and Health Care Policies, 14. IN-
QuIRY 115, 153 (1977).
25. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "certificate of need" (CON) will be used in its
broadest sense, referring to the generic kind of regulatory control that is being exercised over
capital expenditures; consequently, state CON statutes, the federal 1122 review program (Social
Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1386 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-I
(1976)), and even those reviews backed by sanctions in conformance clauses of privately spon-
sored reimbursement contracts (most notably those developed by miscellaneous Blue Cross plans)
will all be included in the review. Because of requirements in the National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300k-300t (1976)), with which states must comply by 1980, and the anticipated repeal of the
1122 program (promised by HEW to occur when states comply with the planning act's standards),
the federal CON procedures and standards most frequently cited in this article will be based on
the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §§ 300m-300t (1976). The analysis will not be lhnited, however, to
the federal requirements, since only seven states had federally conforming programs as of October
1978 and most of the nation's experience with CON has been with a wide range of systems. Fur-
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tal principles, however, are generally uniform and entail administrative
procedures basically analogous to those involved in issuing permits or
licenses. A CON is essentially a license required by the state before
certain types of medical care projects may be initiated. The CON proc-
ess is composed of several stages. A project is initiated by a health care
provider, customarily an institutional provider, although physician of-
fices have been included in several state laws. It is then submitted to
the reviewing agency, either an agency of state government or the
quasi-governmental health systems agency (HSA), for approval. In
many states, such as Colorado, projects are submitted concurrently to
both; the division of authority between the two, however, is not always
clear.
After a determination that the project is subject to review (it ex-
ceeds a specific dollar threshold, it is not subject to a "grandfather"
clause, etc.), the substantive review of the project's merit commences.
Within a fixed time period (now ninety days under P.L. 93-64126), the
project is reviewed for conformity with existing standards, criteria and
plans that under the tenets of health planning stand as the basic mea-
suring instruments used to evaluate community need. Specifically, it is
studied for financial feasibility and for its effect on prevailing commu-
nity health costs and quality and availability of care. In some states,
including Colorado, the burden of proof is clearly on the proponent of
the project. In other states, the location of the burden of proof is not
clear.27 Under the provisions of P.L. 93-641, the burden will clearly be
on the project's proponent, at least for inpatient hospital services.28
Under CON statutes all licensed hospitals and, in most states, all
licensed nursing homes are subject to review regardless of the source of
financing for the project.2 9 Failure to obtain a CON renders the pro-
vider subject to such sanctions as loss of license, injunctive proscription
and ineligibility for payment from some or all third-party payors.
The CON process is generally classified as adjudicatory.30
thermore, this article will focus on the hospital sector-the most inflationary part of the health
care industry-where CON controls have been used longer and more extensively than elsewhere.
26. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641,
88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976)).
27. See generaly Bovbjerg, Problems and Prospecls for Healh Planning: The Importance of
Incentives, Standards, and Procedures in Certftfcate of Need, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 83, 118-120.
28. See 42 C.F.R. § 122.309 (1978).
29. North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aj'd
mer., 435 U.S. 962 (1978); see CHAYET & SONNENREICH, P.C., supra note 21, at 9-11.
30. See, e.g., Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. Governor's Certificate of Need Appeal Bd.,
304 Minn. 209, 213, 230 N.W.2d 176, 180 (1975).
1264 [Vol. 57
CERTIFICA TE OF NEED
Whether CON should be an adversarial rather than a consultative
process, however, remains a hotly debated issue in many states, espe-
cially among providers. Opponents of an adversarial system are con-
cerned about the length of time it would take to conduct full-blown
evidentiary hearings (including rights of cross-examination) for each of
the several CON cases decided monthly by the CON decisionmaker.
There is also an apprehension about excessive legalism that is common
not only among health providers but also among many veterans of
health planning activities who were reared on the "cooperative" model
of health planning and trained in methods of community organization.
It is feared that a shift to full evidentiary hearings would bring conflict-
oriented decisionmaking rather than the consenus-oriented model that
has dominated the largely voluntary, nonprofit health care sector.3 ' It
is also feared that the shift would result in a transfer of control over the
health care system from the health providers and professionals to the
lawyers. Proponents of the adversarial approach, on the other hand,
question whether lawyers-or traditional legal process--can or should
be kept out of a decisionmaking system that often involves multimillion
dollar decisions, complex statutory procedures, and the future of long
established, resource intensive and popularly supported institutions.
Appeals of decisions adverse to the applicant have been granted as
a matter of right. Under the provisions of P.L. 93-641, an HSA also has
standing to appeal a decision made by the state CON decisionmaker
that is contrary to its recommendation.32 Administrative remedies are
generally required to be exhausted before judicial review can be ob-
tained, but the latter is typically granted pursuant to the state's admin-
istrative procedure act (APA). The applicability of the state's APA to
the procedures of the earlier HSA review remains an unsettled legal
issue. Furthermore, the standing of parties other than the proponent
and the HSA to appeal a decision adverse to their interests is increas-
ingly a matter of debate; few state CON statutes presently provide for
broad standing.33
31. "The idea was that if providers were brought together and properly informed, they would
come to appreciate the mutuality of interests among them and with the communities they served.
With technical assistance furnished by the planning agency, each hospital would willingly plan for
its own development." Klarman, Health Planning: Progress, Prospects and Issues, 56 MILBANK
MEM. FUND Q. 78, 88 (1978). See also Gottlieb, Certificate of Need Potential Threat to Planning,
HosPITALS, December 16, 1971, at 51.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-l(b)(13) (1976). See generaly Dolan, Who Has Standing to Appeal
Cerlificate-of-Need Decisions?, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 155.
33. See generally Dolan, supra note 32.
12651979]
NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW
A CON generally must be exercised within specific time periods
(for example, binding contracts must be entered into by the provider to
commence the project within twelve months) and must be consistent
with the terms of the application (for example, a piece of equipment
estimated in the application to cost $500,000 and approved on that ba-
sis should not cost the provider $1 million at the actual time of acquisi-
tion).34 A CON has been regarded as not otherwise subject to
limitation after approval, however, and little monitoring is currently
being done to assure compliance with the terms of the CON decision or
the representations made by the project proponent in the CON
application.
II. PAST APPRAISALS OF CERTIFICATE OF NEED PROGRAMS
A. The Majority View- "A Failure"
Despite strong advocacy of the CON program by the Carter Ad-
ministration, leading senators and congressmen, and such private sec-
tor representatives as business and labor groups, insurance companies,
and even provider groups themselves, 35 the majority view is that the
program has, to date, been a failure.36 The most damaging piece of
evidence in support of this conclusion is the extremely high approval
rate in those states with CON programs-the great majority of all
projects submitted for review have been approved.37 In addition,
"grandfather" provisions incorporated into most state CON statutes to
protect those projects already commenced from ex post facto reviews
may have spurred many providers to accelerate plans for expansion
prior to the law's passage, and may have even led to a rebirth of
projects previously shelved by the providers themselves.
38
34. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-509 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
35. State hospital associations have tended to support efforts to enact CON laws, giving rise
to speculation by some observers that CON programs will result in a pro-industry anti-consumer
bias helping to preserve health care cartels and protecting them from competition. See, e.g., Hav-
ighurst, Franchising Experience from Other Industries and its Relevancefor the Health Field, in
MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM ON HOSPITAL FRANCHISING (1973).
36. See, e.g., LEWIN & ASSOCIATES, INC., EVALUATION OF THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF THE SECTION 1122 REVIEW PROCESS (1975); Hellinger, The Effect of Certiflcate-of-Need
Legislation on HospitalInvestment, 13 INQUIRY 187 (1976); Salkever & Bice, The Impact of Certfit.
cate-of-Need Controls on Hospital Investment, 54 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 185 (1976).
37. A 1975 study indicated that 93% of all CON projects submitted to review in 20 states were
approved. LEWIN & ASSOCIATES, INC., supra note 36. But see American Health Planning Associ-
ation, Selected Preliminary Results from a Survey of Health Planning Agencies: HSA Perform-
ance Under Certificate of Need and 1122 Programs (Nov. 28, 1978) [hereinafter cited as American
Health Planning Association report.]
38. The recent controversy in California regarding the passage of AB 4001 is the most visible
1266 [Vol. 57
CERTIFICA TE OF NEED
In states such as New York and Massachusetts, where the approval
rate for CON has been lower than average and where reviews have
been occurring for at least several years, the rate of health care infla-
tion-especially in the hospital sector, the primary target of CON-
continues to rise at rates substantially above the country's general infla-
tion rate. 9 These findings tend to corroborate the results of a 1976
study by Bice and Salkever showing that from f968 to 1972 (the early
days of CON) the programs had no apparent effect on slowing the rate
of overall hospital asset growth even though they were successfully re-
ducing the rate of hospital bed growth. In addition, the study found a
greater rate of asset growth in states with CON than in states without it.
The authors concluded that hospitals were merely shifting new expend-
itures into areas immune from review, such as equipment and
salaries.4 °
Another piece of evidence pointing toward the failure of the CON
system is the inconsistency of the outcomes of review4 '-a significant
defect in a regulatory system that must be judged by standards of fair-
ness as well as stringency. Inconsistency arises from several causes:
comparable projects may be handled differently by the relatively au-
tonomous regional planning bodies within the states (now the HSAs,
previously the CHP "b" agencies), which may well possess different
levels of staff competence, adopt review standards and criteria of diver-
gent stringency and scope, and be guided by boards with differing ori-
case in point. It has been estimated that $2.7 billion in new capital expenditures resulted from the
passage of AB 4001, a much tougher state CON law than the California program it replaced. This
estimate has been challenged by the official responsible for the California program, who claimed
that only $150 million could be attributed to projects "generated or accelerated" to beat the new
law's deadline, although he did concede that $1 billion in projects had been grandfathered under
the law's exemption of projects that would result in "substantial economic loss" if discontinued
(the lesser of $75,000 or 10% of the project total). Letter from Saleem A. Farag, Chief, Office of
Statewide Health Planning and Development, to Dr. Stuart H. Shapiro, Office of United States
Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Nov. 23, 1977). See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 437.1 l(b)(3)
(West Supp. 1978).
39. See, e.g., Health Care Expenditures in Massachusetts, White Paper prepared by the
Health Planning and Policy Group of the Commonwealth (June 9, 1978).
40. Salkever & Bice, supra note 36, at 206-09. See also Hellinger, supra note 36, at 191-92.
41. See, e.g., North Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Office of Community Medical Facilities, 355 So. 2d
1272, 1275, 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (final administrative decision to deny a CON for a
hospital to acquire a CAT scanner reversed, in part, because a CON for a CAT scanner had been
granted to another hospital in the same county during the pendency of the application in question
when the same standard for review-a 2400 scan per year utilization rate-had been in place and
the other facility had failed to meet the standard). See also Northwest Hosp. v. Illinois Health
Facilities Planning Bd., 59 Ill. App. 3d 221,227-28, 375 N.E.2d 1327, 1332 (1978) (denial of appli-
cation for new medical/surgical and intensive care beds reversed because the standard, created by
defendant for use in ruling on plaintiff's application alone, was against substantial weight of the
evidence).
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entations (for example, one emphasizing accessibility of care, another
focusing on cost containment). The state CON decisionmaker, should
it decide to defer to frequently diverse regional recommendations, then
renders different final decisions on comparable projects within the
state.42
Temporal differences in project submission may also result in in-
consistent decisions-for example, a project submitted before plans or
criteria have been adopted or revised may well fare better than a com-
parable project submitted afterward. Similarly, a project that is sub-
mitted and approved may well be treated differently than a subsequent,
comparable project if only because the first program has fully satisfied
the identified need in the community for the service and the second
project-however excellent the proponent's reputation for quality, cost-
effectiveness and service to low-income individuals-is, therefore, re-
garded as redundant. This approach is consistent with precedent else-
where in the field of law and public policy and can be defended as
necessary and appropriate for a system that must not remain blindly
tied to outdated approaches or allow unproductive duplication.
43
Political interference can lead to favored treatment and conse-
quently to inconsistent outcomes. The most notable of such efforts has
occurred in Massachusetts, where the state legislature recently passed
twelve special bills to grant CONs to twelve facilities whose applica-
tions had been denied by the state agency. Governor Dukakis vetoed
all twelve bills, but the Massachusetts legislature succeeded in overrid-
ing two of the vetoes.44 Several years earlier, a Massachusetts court
reviewed two special bills passed by the state legislature to grant per-
42. The likelihood of this occurring depends, of course, on the diversity of the HSAs within
the state, the perceived competence and political strength of the HSA and state agency, the nature
of the project, and the scope of review and appeal rights under the state CON statute. The Ari-
zona CON law, for example, requires the state decisionmaker to adopt the HSA's recommenda-
tion unless he finds that its findings are arbitrary, capricious or not supported by substantial
evidence. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-433.02 (West Supp. 1978). While the Arizona law is not
typical and is not in conformity with the requirements of P.L. 93-641, it does illustrate the problem
in other states where the state's scope of review of HSA actions may be limited, especially when a
favorable action has been taken on the CON application. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:2H- I
(West Supp. 1978); Somers & Somers, Certificate of Need Regulation: The Case ofNelp Jersey,, in
REGIONALIZATION AND HEALTH POLICY (E. Ginzberg ed. 1977).
43. See, e.g., Saint Joseph's Hosp. v. Finley, 153 N.J. Super. 214, 225, 379 A.2d 467, 472
(1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 595, 384 A.2d 825 (1978), in which the court ruled that it was "entirely
within [the] power and responsibility [of the CON Board] as a continuing regulatory body, in the
light of present and future considerations in the public interest," to adopt new regional regulations
regarding cardiac surgery units, despite prior determinations to the contrary.
44. HEALTH BRIEFS, September 1977 (prepared by the Massachusetts Office of State Health
Planning).
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mission to two hospitals to expand after their CON applications had
been rejected by the state agency; the court determined that the legisla-
tive actions were lawful, having violated neither the federal nor the
state constitution.
45
The recent uproar in Oklahoma over the proposed Oral Roberts
Hospital, in which a CON was sought for a $250 million medical com-
plex including a 777 bed hospital, illustrates the political issues lurking
in CON reviews. In the Oral Roberts case the state CON deci-
sionmaker, consisting of three state officials (all gubernatorial appoin-
tees), overrode the negative recommendation of the HSA after the state
legislature, in the face of a massive letter writing campaign launched by
Rev. Roberts, passed an unprecedented resolution supporting the pro-
ject. The local HSA and several Tulsa hospitals have filed an appeal,
and the decision is now being challenged in court. 6
It should be noted parenthetically that all CON decisions are in-
herently political since they affect the allocation of scarce resources-
money, staff and status.47 In addition, given the reviewing agency's de-
pendence on the legislature for state authorizations and appropriations
for operating expenses (even if it is only for authorization to spend fed-
eral monies already received or allocation of the twenty-five percent
state match required under P.L. 93-641), it is difficult to fault the sensi-
tivity of CON reviewers within the executive branch to the concerns of
influential state legislators. Nonetheless, it is a problem in the present
CON system that has contributed to the lack of effectiveness of many
state programs.48
Other inconsistencies may arise among comparable projects be-
cause of nonsubstantive differences in the quality of the project's advo-
cacy as evidenced by the degree of professionalism of the written
application or of the oral presentation submitted to the CON deci-
sionmaker. Most of the costs incurred by a provider in developing and
later presenting his CON proposal are reimbursable from patient
45. Commissioner of Pub. Health v. Bessie M. Burke Mem. Hosp., 366 Mass. 734, 323 N.E.2d
309 (1975). See Weiner, Participatory Procedure and Political Support for Hospital Cost Contain-
ment Programs: Limits of Open Administrative Process, this Symposium, at text accompanying
notes 114-27.
46. For a more complete description of surrounding events, see NEWSWEEK, May 8, 1978, at
43.
47. See text accompanying notes 127-49 infra.
48. The 1978 session of Congress considered, but did not introduce, amendments to P.L. 93-
641 that would have withheld federal financial support from health programs in states where the
legislature explicitly overrules an administrative CON decision; such an approach, however,
would do little for situations in which political pressures are used more subtly.
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sources, including public and private third-party payors. This fact
tends to reward large urban facilities and penalize smaller rural facili-
ties that have less access to consultants, a greater hesitancy to utilize
"outsiders," and a smaller allocation of overhead funds that can be
used at the institution's discretion.
Prior to 1975, many regional health planning bodies received
direct financial support from providers and provider associations-the
very institutions whose projects they were required to review under
CON. The possibility thus arose for favored, inconsistent and obvi-
ously inappropriate reviews. Provisions of P.L. 93-641 now specifically
prohibit CON review and health planning agencies from receiving such
"tainted" money.
4 9
In contrast to Bice and Salkover's examination of outcomes under
CON, studies by Lewin and Associates examined CON procedures,
structures and standards utilized in decisionmaking and found signifi-
cant defects throughout the system.5 0 Relatively few CON matters
have reached the courts, but of those cases reported, several judicial
decisions, based on findings of procedural irregularities, have resulted
in reversals of CON decisions made at the administrative level. The
most cited procedural errors have been the failure of the state CON
reviewing agency to develop an adequate adjudicatory or rulemaking
record5' or to promulgate procedures and standards pursuant to the
state's APA.52 Some courts have also struck down CON decisions on
49. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-1(b)(5) (1976).
50. LEWIN & ASSOCIATES, INC., supra note 36; LEWIN & ASSOCIATES, INC., EVALUATION OF
NEW YORK STATE'S CERTIFICATE OF NEED PROGRAM (1977).
51. See North Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Office of Community Medical Facilities, 355 So. 2d
1272, 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), in which the court found that the CON review standard of
2400 CAT scans per annum was not supported by "sufficient, competent and substantial"
evidence.
52. See Nebraska Methodist Hosp. v. Casari, [1978 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDI-
CAID GUIDE (CCH) 29,205 (D. Neb. Aug. 18, 1978), in which the disapproval of a $28 million
project by the CON agency (in this case the Designated Planning Agency under the 1122 pro-
gram) was struck down because the agency had failed to promulgate valid regulations pursuant to
state law. The court rendered this ruling even though the state agency had issued rules (though
the state's APA had not been complied with) and was conducting the 1122 program pursuant not
to any state law but in accord with a contract with the federal government. The court stated that
the "federal government cannot authorize a state agency to act where it could not otherwise act."
Id. at 10,306. But see St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Finley, 153 N.J. Super. 214, 379 A.2d 467 (1977), cert.
denied, 75 N.J. 595, 384 A.2d 825 (1978). The Casari ruling may be in conflict with the Supreme
Court's decision in North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978), which upheld
the constitutionality of CON even as applied to a state where CON had been earlier ruled uncon-
stitutional. See also In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d
729 (1973). Furthermore, the court's ruling in Casari that no 1122 program can be implemented
in a state until valid state regulations are promulgated is highly questionable; no other court has so
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substantive grounds, specifically because of inconsistent treatment of
comparable projects.53
Other concerns about CON have been raised, and although largely
undocumented at the present time, they warrant a brief mention. CON
staff have been described as underpaid and underutilized, with a high
turnover rate, as exemplified, perhaps not suprisingly, by the Massa-
chusetts experience in which there were four CON administrators dur-
ing a recent three-year period.54 Further, it was anticipated that CON
would stifle innovation and result in cartelization of the health sys-
tem;-5 however, no evidence has been adduced showing that health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), out-patient surgicenters, or other
innovative services have been prejudicially treated. 6 Finally, compli-
ance with the CON process itself has been called inflationary because
of the costs incurred in preparing and presenting a competent and com-
prehensive application. 7 As discussed above, costs incurred for such a
purpose can be sizable ($5,000 to $10,000 is a recent estimate in Colo-
rado), but they are reimbursable and are thus ultimately picked up by
consumers and taxpayers.
B. The Minority View. ' 4 Limited Success"
The supporters of CON have been less effusive in praising the pro-
gram than the critics have been vehement in damning it. Supporters
believe that during the last two years there has been a substantial im-
provement in the quality and results of the program. They also believe
that many of the program's recent successes still cannot be quantified.58
held since the 1122 program began in 1972. The decision has, nonetheless, prompted emergency
rulemaking in at least one state, Colorado.
53. See note 41 supra.
54. Medeiros, Long Range Institutional Plans and Budgets: Can They Provide a Vehicle for
Anticioatorj Strategies?, in LINKING HEALTH PLANNING AND REGULATION TO INCREASE COST
EFFECTIVENESS 14 (M. Sweetland & K. Bauer eds. 1977).
55. See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 10.
56. See, e.g., LEwIN & ASsoCIArEs, INC., supra note 36. See also text accompanying notes
103-04 infra.
57. D. KINZER, HEALTH CONTROLS OUT OF CONTROL 97 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Remarks of Joseph A. Califano, supra note 17, at 7-10. See the American
Health Planning Association report, supra note 37, at 1-2, which cites an approval rate of 75% for
all capital investment among those 134 of 203 HSAs surveyed (covering approximately 60% of the
population), with alleged savings of over $1 billion during 1976-1978. It is important to note,
however, that the statistics covered not only formally submitted and finally determined projects
but also "unofficial though documentable actions which led to the withdrawal or non-submission
of CON/ 1122 applications." Id. The study is, by the admission of its own authors, very prelimi-
nary: its base data has not been verified; it covers neither the full universe of HSAs nor state
agencies; no verification has been performed on the category labelled "unofficial but document-
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Other proponents assert that CON has improved institutional
planning within those facilities subject to its jurisdiction. 9 Many
health institutions have underdeveloped internal planning capabilities
and would clearly benefit from any program that required them to bet-
ter define their present and future goals and objectives. Such internal
planning may become increasingly necessary to justify a provider's
CON applications and may help to rationalize a desired project in
terms of established community goals. These planning efforts may also
be useful to the facility in determining a tactically appropriate response
to a CON application from a local or regional competitor.60
Finally, CON has been said to serve as a forum to make the gen-
eral public, large purchasers of health care such as labor trust fund
directors and corporate employee benefit managers, and the news me-
dia more aware of the forces driving up health care costs. This in-
creased cost consciousness would result, it is argued, from bringing the
reasons for and implications of expansionist health decisions out of the
private boardroom of individual health institutions and insurance com-
panies and into a public decisionmaking forum.6'
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT CERTIFICATE OF
NEED PROGRAMS
In P.L. 93-641 Congress attempted to spur the development of new
state CON programs and the improvement of existing programs. Con-
gress has also shown interest in amending federal legislation to amelio-
rate problems that continue to exist. But while the lure of federal
dollars may have induced some improvement of the nation's CON pro-
grams, the inherent structural problems to be discussed in this section
indicate that without substantial reform the prospects for effective
CON efforts will remain dim.
The increase in federal funding to HSAs and state agencies under
P.L. 93-641, and the prohibition against provider financial support to
these agencies, may help assure more professional staff and end the
able" regarding withdrawn or never-submitted projects; and, most importantly, it fails to examine,
as Bice and Salkever would require, whether the overall level of capital resources flowing into the
hospital sector has stabilized or declined. See Salkever & Bice, supra note 36.
59. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, THE PRACTICE OF PLANNING IN HEALTH CARE IN-
STITUTIONS, 83-86 (1973). See also Peters, L-R Planning May Direct Change, Impact, December
26, 1978 (newsletter published by PACT Health Planning Center, Denver, Colorado).
60. See generally Medeiros, supra note 54, at 13-17.
61. See, e.g., Remarks of Joseph A. Califano, supra note 17, at 10.
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"strings attached" funding for many regional CON agencies. Requir-
ing facilities actively to explore "less expensive alternatives" and, as a
precondition to granting a CON for projects involving in-patient serv-
ices, forcing the CON decisionmaker to make written findings in as
many as ten areas, should also prove beneficial in strengthening the
CON process.62 The emergence of the various plans63 required under
P.L. 93-641 may prove useful in conducting CON reviews, but only if
they are of good quality-a very uncertain prospect.
Inadequate plans will only serve to bolster the CON cases of unde-
serving applicants. If the plans are too generous, they will tend to show
an inappropriate need for a project; if the plans are overly stringent,
they may be attacked as arbitrary, capricious and lacking a rational
basis and will generate sympathy for the CON applicant unless techni-
cal support for the plan can be summoned. This recently occurred in a
Florida case involving the denial of a CON for a CAT scanner.64 In
denying the hospital's application the state CON reviewers invoked a
utilization guideline of 2,400 scans per year for CAT scanners, a guide-
line recommended by the federal government.6" A Florida appellate
court reviewing the decision ruled not only that no rulemaking record
had been developed by the CON agency to indicate whether any seri-
ous agency consideration had been given to the reasonableness of the
utilization standards or their suitability to the proposed service area
(the city of Miami) but also that use of the standard as the sole review
criterion was inappropriate. Consequently, the court ruled in favor of
the hospital and granted it the CON even though there were several
scanners operating at less than capacity within a five mile radius of the
hospital, far more than is generally thought appropriate.66
Moreover, given the general experience to date of inadequate con-
sumer involvement and pervasive provider influence (if not de facto
domination),67 it is doubtful that the system being developed under the
terms of P.L. 93-641 will provide the balanced political support needed
62. 42 C.F.R. § 123.410 (1977).
63. See text accompanying notes 86-107 infra. See also Atkisson & Grimes, Health Planning
in the United States: An Old Idea with a New Signfance, I J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 295
(1976).
64. North Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Office of Community Medical Facilities, 355 So. 2d
1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
65. Id. at 1275.
66. Id. at 1276-77.
67. See, e.g., Texas Acorn v. Texas Area 5 Health Systems Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019 (5th
Cir. 1977); Vladeck, Interest-Group Representation and the HSAs." Health Planning and Political
Theory, 67 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 23 (1977).
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for an effective CON process. In fact, the multiple levels of review re-
quired by the federal planning law may well have the effect of dimin-
ishing the quality and rigor of the final analysis.6"
Finally, the increased functions of HSAs and state planning agen-
cies required by the federal law will probably harm the process, rather
than aid it, by significantly increasing the workload for CON reviews in
a system that is generally unable to handle competently its current
workload in an expeditious fashion.
If CON is to be an effective tool for cost-containment, additional
changes to the CON mechanism must go beyond those presently em-
bodied in P.L. 93-641 or now being considered as amendments. A re-
formed CON system must be capable of responding to the causes of
health care inflation in a practical and effective fashion, recognizing the
structural defects in the health care industry, the industry's political
power, the American penchant for convenience and the latest in tech-
nology, and the currently prevailing mistrust of government and regu-
lation. Without these basic reforms, the CON mechanism will have
little, if any, impact on rising health costs.
A. The Current CON Process Is Too Reactive
Virtually by definition, CON is a passive and reactive mechnan-
ism. Under the current system, projects are conceived, developed and
submitted by proponents who are under little, if any, obligation to con-
fer with other interested parties-whether other institutional providers,
cost-containment watchdog groups, public and private quality assur-
ance agencies, third-party payors, or the CON review agencies. Be-
cause of the relatively short period of time (90 days)69 generally
allowed as the maximum for conducting all stages of a CON review (at
the level of the sub-HSA, if any, HSA and state), once the project has
been submitted and found to be "complete," there is precious little time
for other interested parties to mobilize-first, to decide whether to eval-
uate the project for its potential impact on their concerns or self-inter-
est, then to conduct an adequate analysis of the proposal and, possibly,
compare that study with any performed by other interested parties, and
finally to submit the appraisal to the reviewing agencies at a point early
enough in the review cycle to be useful. For projects commonly six
months to two years in the making and hundreds of pages or more in
68. See text accompanying notes 165-79 infra.
69. 42 C.F.R. § 122.306 2(ii) (1977).
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length, the fifteen to forty-five days generally available to carry out all
these tasks is frequently inadequate, even if resources could be found to
conduct such reviews.
This lack of sufficient time to respond is undoubtedly one reason
for the predominance of "logrolling" among providers (the "I support
your proposal, you support mine" syndrome) even when a specific pro-
ject, if approved, could substantially injure the interests of a neighbor-
ing facility. The failure of providers to be actively involved in the
review of applications from potential competitors denies the CON re-
viewers valuable information that may be available only from -another
health care provider in the community. It also tends to create a difficult
political environment in which a project may receive wide ranging sup-
port far beyond its own intrinsic merit. The "batching" of several simi-
lar projects for CON review for the purpose of approving only one is
now regarded as an important tactic for breaking up this "logrolling
syndrome. '"70
Another problem resulting from the reactive nature of the CON
process is that capital expenditures in the health field are initiated by
health providers, who often respond to their own institutional impera-
tives rather than to the needs of the community they serve.71 Conse-
quently, CON review staffs spend much of their time on projects that
are not developed to address the priority health needs of people in their
service area-which should be the primary focus of their planning ef-
forts. Had the resource development provisions of P.L. 93-641 (Title
XVI), which were designed to replace the old Hill-Burton program,
been funded by Congress, the reactive nature of the CON mechanism
might have been lessened. While in most states CON may now repre-
sent the primary means of assuring public accountability of health care
development, it is a negative control, not a positive one. A complemen-
tary affirmative planning mechanism is sorely needed.
B. Few Incentives Exist to Support a Rigorous CON Decisionmaking
System
If CON decisionmaking were an exact science, the lack of incen-
tives and support mechanisms for rigorous decisionmaking might be
less important because CON decisions, however unpopular, could be
objectively verified and thus shielded, at least to some degree, from the
70. See text accompanying notes 150-55 infra.
71. See, e.g., L. RUSSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN HOSPITALS 8 (1978).
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pressures of influential groups. CON decisions, however, like many
other public policy matters, are based on imperfect information, un-
proven hypotheses, and best guesses about outcomes. Consequently,
they are subject to second-guessing and criticism-not all of which is
constructive in either intention or effect.
CON decisionmakers presently have few incentives to say "no."
Second-guessing of CON decisions is commonplace, not only through
the filing of administrative and judicial appeals, but through contacts
with elected officials-both spontaneous and orchestrated-from an in-
stitution's medical and administrative staff, its trustees, and the com-
munity it serves. Despite the popular rhetoric about consumer power,
most consumers, no matter how much they may complain about rising
health costs in the abstract, sympathize with the expansionist tenden-
cies of their local hospital rather than with the cost-containment con-
cerns of the CON reviewers.72 Unless there is well-organized support
from business or labor, as there has been in such cities as Detroit, Cin-
cinnati and Rochester,73 or a crisis involving the budget of a state be-
cause of accelerating Medicaid expenditures, as in New York and
Massachusetts, 74 reviewers are loathe to deny CON applications in all
but the most clear-cut cases. This reluctance exists at both the HSA
level, where the activities of the chiefly private nonprofit agency require
consensus, voluntary compliance, and support from the diverse pro-
vider community, and at the state level, where the threat of legislative
or gubernatorial retaliation against the agency's budget or personnel
may arise when a politically unpopular CON decision receives
attention.
Finally, given the passive and open-ended nature of CON and the
self-doubt fostered by the use of imperfect data and imperfect evalua-
tion tools in decisionmaking, there is little incentive for a reviewing
agency to perservere and deny an application in the face of its own
lingering uncertainty about the need for a project. These constraints
become even more powerful when political pressures are delivered or
anticipated from influential interest groups and when there is little op-
portunity for the CON reviewers to believe that the funds at issue-if
denied in a particular case-would be redirected into a more appropri-
ate health service project.75
72. Louis HARRIS POLL, supra note 11, at 56.
73. See note Il1 infra.
74. See note 142 infra.
75. For an analysis of how a similar lack of incentives affects the operations of another health
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C. CON Programs Suffer from Lack of Accountability, Redundancy
of Function, and Confusion over the Appropriate Role for
Staff
P.L. 93-641 has been applauded for its adherence to the principles
of "bottom-up" planning. HSAs, unlike their predecessors, the CHP
"b" agencies,76 have the right to review CON projects and recommend
approval or disapproval." This language seems to contrast sharply
with the "review and comment" responsibilities of the CHP "b" agen-
cies.78 In reality, however, HSA actions on CON applications may, de-
pending on the provisions of the specific state law, be little more than
advisory opinions for the state CON reviewing agency, which may con-
duct its own de novo review regarding the finding of facts and the ap-
plication of law, health plans, standards and criteria relevant to the
project.
In the case of a disagreement, the HSA has the right to receive
from the state an explanation why its recommendation was not fol-
lowed and to appeal from an adverse state action, assuming the agency
possesses the financial resources to prosecute an appeal.7 9 This is likely
to be a rare event because most HSAs may well decide to spend their
limited resources in other ways and would also be reluctant to antago-
nize the state health planning and development agency (SHPDA), an
agency with which the HSA has repeated dealings, and with whom the
HSA is likely to seek to remain on good terms.8 0
Sub-area councils, if they exist in a health service area, stand, for
purposes of CON review, in the same relationship to the HSA as the
HSA does to the SHPDA except that they lack any statutory basis and
are without any appeal rights under P.L. 93-641. Nevertheless, in some
jurisdictions they also conduct reviews of pending CON projects, fre-
regulatory agency, the PSRO, see Blumstein, Inflation and Quality. The Case of PSROs, in
HEALTH: A VICTIM OR A CAUSE OF INFLATION? 245, 283-84 (M. Zubkoff ed. 1976).
76. Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-749, 80 Stat. 1180 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976)).
77. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641,
§ 1513(0, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976)).
78. Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-749, 80 Stat. 1180 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976)).
79. 42 C.F.R. § 123.409(a)(9) (1977).
80. H. FOLEY, A REPORT ON THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH
PLANNING PROGRAM 14-15 (1978) ("The health planning act intended strong state and local par-
ticipation in the planning process. We currently see a need for an even stronger role for the
states.") (comments of Dr. Henry A. Foley, Administrator of the Health Resources Administra-
tion, to the National Council on Health Planning and Development).
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quently holding hearings and rendering decisions based on their find-
ings of fact and their applications of law, plans, standards and criteria.
Their work, however, is only advisory to the HSA, whose decisions are,
in turn, only advisory to the SHPDA.
Clearly, some economy must be brought to this system. If there
were a single hearing before the final CON decisionmaker, lay review-
ers could take their responsibility more seriously, the work of profes-
sional staff could be better focused and less overlapping, providers
would complain less of redundant review procedures and their attend-
ant costs, and interested parties, including community and consumer
groups, could better concentrate their efforts. As the system is presently
structured, concerned members of the public risk having their time and
energies drained by the plethora of meetings, hearings and discussions
now common to the CON system. Thus, the field is effectively left
open only to the professional advocates and lobbyists whose job it is to
attend all such meetings.
The present multiplicity of hearing levels also increases the possi-
bility of inconsistency of findings among the reviewing agencies, espe-
cially since in most states no findings are binding upon subsequent
reviewers until after the state level review. Even at the state level, ap-
peals from the primary CON decisionmaker may, in some states, give
rise to a full de novo review. Such inconsistencies may not only pro-
vide the basis for the filing of dilatory appeals, but also tend to under-
cut the apparent legitimacy of CON decisions; this is especially true of
those CON actions that reject particular applications,"' which under
present state laws and judicial interpretations of standing constitute the
great preponderance of CON appeals.8"
Another problem with the current CON system is the lack of a
clear control point. The SHPDA is responsible for the final adminis-
trative decision, but it possesses no direct administrative control over
the HSAs or any sub-area councils. HSAs are funded directly by
HEW; funds are not channeled through the state agency.83 The con-
cerns about HSA performance expressed by HEW have related prima-
rily to grants management and requirements for HSA structure and
procedures. Outcomes of performances have rarely been examined by
81. See Northwest Hosp. v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Bd., 59 I11. App. 3d 221, 375
N.E.2d 1327 (1978).
82. See generall, Dolan, supra note 32. Four states (Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota and Wash-
ington) restrict appeals to denials only. Id. at 162 n.36.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-5 (1976).
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HEW in monitoring the activities of HSAs, especially in the regulatory
review areas. In addition, HSAs are unable or unwilling to alter the
performance of sub-area councils (where they exist), usually claiming
that the tenets of P.L. 93-641 require, at least in theory, bottom-up
planning.
The Statewide Health Coordinating Council (SHCC) is made up
of between thirteen and eighty-three members. In most states, it meets
several times a year, is composed of volunteer members, and is staffed
by the SHPDA, though it usually also receives continuing input from
HSA staff members (sixty percent of the SHCC membership is nomi-
nated by the HSAs).84 This unwieldy structure and procedure makes it
possible, even under the best of circumstances, for the SHCC to per-
form only its most fundamental assignments, such as providing advice
to the SHPDA and making only the most general policy decisions. It is
not an agency for resolving difficult questions regarding the operations
of a regulatory system, such as the reasonableness of deadlines, the ad-
equacy of review criteria, the quality of available health data, or the
appropriate division of functions between competing state and regional
bodies. In addition, HEW recently determined that the SHCC should
not serve as the CON appeal body."
This confusion over who is in charge makes it exceedingly difficult
to manage, let alone reform, the system. The interested agencies them-
selves have no adequate place to resolve their differences, for even the
state legislature lacks sufficient jurisdiction over the federally funded
and federally accountable HSAs. The SHPDA that is nominally in
charge of the CON program has no real control over the HSA, for it
exercises no control over the HSA's budget, the hiring of its staff or the
actions of its board of directors.
The absence of an administrative focus also makes it difficult for
reformers outside the system, provider representatives or other govern-
ment officials to fix responsibility for deficiencies in the program and
initiate appropriate corrective measures when necessary. Of course,
this lack of a locus for accountability can also feed the inherent bureau-
cratic tendency of CON agencies and HSAs to shift blame and deny
responsibility for defects in the system.
Another troublesome aspect of CON programs is the uncertainty
84. See generally H. FOLEY, supra note 80, at 7, 15.
85. See Halpern, The Statewide Health Coordinating Council- Can It Work?, HEALTH L. PRO-
JECT LIB. BULL., March 1979, at 99, 102.
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over the appropriate role of CON review staff. Should staff be used
strictly in evaluation or should it be engaged in negotiation with the
applicant? If the latter, should negotiation take place concurrently with
the evaluation, prior to it, or subsequent to it? Should staff be limited
only to technical evaluation or should it, in the all too common case
when there is no effective local constituency for cost-containment, also
engage in soliciting support for staff findings emphasizing cost-contain-
ment from third party payors, large purchasers of health care, or con-
sumer groups? These are certainly not easy issues, but they must be
asked and answers must be sought-if only to generate a code of ethics
for CON reviews that will help guide the reviewers and protect them
from the collateral attacks of providers and consumers over their action
or lack of action in bargaining for project alterations or in stimulating
discussion and commentary regarding specific projects.
D. Cert47cate of Need Lacks the Technical Tools Needed to Perform
Effectively
According to its sponsors, one of the primary advances of P.L. 93-
641 over predecessor health planning programs was to be the increased
emphasis on developing "state of the art" health plans of high quali-
ty.86 The development of these plans would be made possible by pro-
viding the planners with the necessary resources, such as access to
PSRO data sources. Adequate salaries would be paid to help the agen-
cies recruit competent staff, including those with backgrounds in eco-
nomic analysis, public administration and law; regional centers would
be established to provide technical assistance to SHPDA and HSA staff
and board members.87 Federal guidance in plan development was to
be provided through the promulgation of National Health Planning
Guidelines and through closer federal supervision of local and state
planning efforts.8" Finally, by linking the quality of the agency's plans
to its prospects for survival (designation status, level of funding, etc.8 9),
P.L. 93-641 sought to establish a strong incentive system for HSAs and
SHPDAs to commit the necessary resources to perform satisfactorily in
the plan development area. The intent was clear: plans were to be com-
86. See Zwick, Initial Development of National Guidelines for Health Planning, 93 Pun.
HEALTH REP. 407, 408-10 (1978). But see text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
87. See Klarman, Health Planning: Progress, Prospects, and Issues, 56 MILBANK MEM. FUND
Q. 78 (1978).
88. See id.
89. See id.; Zwick, supra note 86.
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prehensive and of high quality. Having been ratified by the public in
an elaborate scheme of public hearings required under the law, they
would provide a legitimate basis for the more controversial regulatory
decisions that would follow-most notably those made by CON pro-
grams. In practice, however, health plans are unlikely to be timely
enough, sufficiently comprehensive, or of high enough quality to be de-
terminative in regulatory reviews. In some regions they may be useful,
but they will not suffice as the sole or, in many instances, the predomi-
nant criteria for evaluating the merits of a proposed CON project. This
is true for several reasons. P.L. 93-641 mandates a plethora of plans,
but it does not require that a proposed CON project be included in any
one of them as an absolute precondition to consideration. The initia-
tive in the system still rests with the providers (the prospective appli-
cants) rather than with the planners and CON reviewers. Hence, even
in theory, P.L. 93-641 does not seek to impose a centralized planning
structure on the health care sector.
The absence of centralized planning has significant implications
for CON. Because projects submitted for CON review are of a wide
variety and under the present law may be submitted at any time, effec-
tive plans must be comprehensive (that is, cover all possible CON ap-
plications including specific services and pieces of equipment) and
must be continuously revised to remain current. Even the optimistic
framers of P.L. 93-641 never intended a planning staff large enough to
develop documents of sufficient breadth to cover all eventualities, nor
did they anticipate that revision would be undertaken frequently
enough so that all new developments in service delivery or equipment
innovation could be covered.
It can be argued that in any market or mixed economy such as that
of the American health care sector, plans may still serve useful social
purposes even though they are passive and lack comprehensiveness.
They can identify areas requiring attention, establish specific goals to
address the problem areas, indicate strategies for goal attainment, and
set standards to determine when the goals have been reached. No mat-
ter how useful these limited plans may be, however, they do not consti-
tute a blueprint for CON decisionmaking as some supporters of P.L.
93-641 had hoped.
Of perhaps more immediate significance is the poor quality of the
current set of health plans. The first generation of documents produced
by the nation's HSAs-the Health Systems Plans (HSPs) and the An-
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nual Implementation Plans (AIPs)-have been roundly criticized by
their own sponsor, HEW, as well as by assorted consumer organiza-
tions. The plans have been characterized as long on description and
short on analysis, advocating few, if any, prescriptions for useful initia-
tives, and possessing weak review criteria for purposes of such regula-
tory programs as appropriateness review, ratesetting and CON.90
Nearly four years into the implementation of P.L. 93-641-itself
largely a continuation of the comprehensive health planning (CHP)
program of seven years' duration9g'-it is difficult to believe that the
planning efforts under P.L. 93-641 will show any sign of marked im-
provement in the near future. In fact, it is sadly characteristic of gov-
ernmental planning programs in America-whether in health, social
services or environmental matters-that document quality is almost
uniformly poor.
92
The reasons for the poor quality of the planning documents have
yet to be carefully analyzed. It is clear that the state of the planning art
is still primitive and that the concept of medical need has not yet been
satisfactorily defined.93 The inadequacies of health planning staff have
long been suspected, although all available data indicate a relative im-
provement in education levels, experience and tenure of current per-
sonnel compared to those who had worked in CHP programs. Also
cited have been the cumbersome multi-level board structures and pro-
cedures of P.L. 93-641, which lead to mediocre results when consensus-
building efforts take priority over analytic rigor, an approach labelled
in Colorado as the "least common denominator" method of planning.
Instances of poor supervision of the planning effort by the federal gov-
ernment have also been admitted by federal spokesmen, including con-
90. An HEW Region ViII memorandum, April 20, 1977, found that "submitted HSPs and
AIPs lacked the clarity and specificity to serve as the basis for the review decisions which a fully
designated agency must make (e.g., Certificate of Need, Proposed Use of Federal Funds, etc.). In
addition, the submitted plans failed to provide the level of specificity to serve as the foundation for
the State Health Plan and The State Medical Facilities Plan."
91. Of 205 HSAs, 106 had been CHP "b" agencies. Implementation of National Health
Planning & Resources Development Act of 1974, [1978] 3 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
1 29,405.
92. See generally Rein, Social Planning: The Searchfor Legitimacy, 35 J. AM. INST. PLAN-
NERS 233 (1969).
93. For a description of the technical and conceptual problems inherent in a health plan
development, see Bachman, Health Planning-The Next Step, 3 HEALTH L. PROJECT Lal. BULL.,
Dec. 1978, at 1. See also Medeiros, supra note 54, at 13-15; Somers & Somers, aupra note 42, at
164; Wagner, Criteria/or Project Review, 1 AM. J. HEALTH PLAN. 11 (1977).
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tradictory directives, impractical work cycles, and overlapping plans. 94
Finally, as indicated above, there continues to be confusion over who is
in charge of planning efforts within the state-the HSAs, the SHPDA,
or the SHCC.95
Three additional deficiencies have greatly hampered effective
planning and CON efforts. The first deficiency is the lack of a national
technology assessment capability through which the efficacy and effi-
ciency as well as safety of new medical technology can be tested and
evaluated before proliferation. The second is the lack of quality of care
data on a provider-specific basis. The third deficiency is the lack of
population-based data, including utilization data.
In floor debate on the proposed 1978 amendments to P.L. 93-641,
Senator Edward Kennedy estimated that the acquisition and utilization
costs of new technology and equipment accounted for approximately
fifty percent of the annual increase in hospital costs.96 Despite the in-
creasing importance during the past ten years of these "creeping inten-
sity" factors for hospital inflation,97 governmental scrutiny is only now
beginning to include technology-related considerations that go beyond
issues of safety (whether the device or procedure will do any harm) to
address questions of effectiveness (will it do it faster and cheaper than
what is already on the market) and efficacy (will it improve patient
94. There is some indication that in developing plans, the paper planning process some-
times takes over from the substance. And some HSAs submitted plans calling for what
they knew we wanted. Much of this, I believe, has to do with our lack of a well thought
out communications program from the Central Office through the Regions to the HSAs.
H. FOLEY, supra note 80, at 5. See also Zwick, supra note 86.
95. See, e.g., U.S. Comptroller General's Report to Congress on the Implementation of the
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974. This report attributed the
difficulties encountered by HSAs in developing plans to such problems as the "unavailability of
health data and national standards and criteria for the health care system, inability to recruit staff,
conflicts between local and state planning agencies over their respective responsibilities. . . , and
delays in receiving technical assistance." [1978] 3 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
29,405.
96. 124 CoNG. REC. S11,905 (daily ed. July 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
97. In a December 1978 conference on medical technology sponsored by the Urban Institute
in West Palm Beach, Florida, Dr. Hal Cohen, Executive Director of the Maryland Hospital Com-
mission, cited a recent report by McKinsey and Company, Inc. that indicated that from 1974 to
1976 hospital cost per capita in the United States rose 7.9% faster than the cost of living. The
McKinsey report broke down the 7.9% increase as follows: 1.6% for hospital wage increases above
cost of living; 1.7% for more labor per "patient day equivalent"-a measure that includes a
weighting for outpatient activity; 4.4% for real non-labor cost increase per patient day equivalent;
and 0.1% for more patient day equivalents per capita. The report identified the components of the
4.4% increase as constituting supplies and equipment associated with doing more tests and other
ancillary activities per patient day-what Cohen labelled "Creeping Intensity." H. Cohen, Infor-
mation Needs in the Public Sector 9 (December 1978) (copy on file in the office of the North
Carolina Law Review).
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outcomes). 9 8 Concurrently, the subject matter focus is also beginning
to reach beyond pharmaceuticals to small medical devices99 and, more
recently, to larger institutional-based medical equipment like CAT
scanners0 0 and procedures like fetal monitoring.' 0'
The lack of facility-specific quality of care data has been very
damaging. Without this information, health planners and CON re-
viewers can, in the midst of the current anti-inflationary campaign, be
accused of engaging in blind budget-cutting without regard to quality
or, alternately, of simplistic, rigid planning evidenced by a mechanistic
application of formulas (for example, "X" number of open-heart surgi-
cal procedures per year equals good care). If they are sensitive to such
charges, CON reviewers and planners may, in some cases, overcom-
pensate and misinterpret the nature of a project, in the mistaken belief
that quality of care considerations, rather than the imperatives of insti-
tutional economics (such as providing a profitable service like alcohol-
ism treatment) or of institutional politics (such as accommodating the
medical staff's desires for convenience or the latest technology), are
prompting the submission. 102
Furthermore, the lack of quality of care data can place CON re-
viewers in a difficult position when reviewing innovative projects that,
if approved, would inject a competitive alternative-a real freedom of
choice-into the health care system of a community. Such projects are
frequently resented by the established health care providers of the com-
munity, and quality of care is customarily the reason given publicly to
justify this opposition. Now that anticompetitive practices of profes-
98. See generally A. COCHRANE, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY (1972).
99. See generally Iglehart, supra note 12.
100. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPUTED
TOMOGRAPHY (CT) SCANNER (1978).
101. See H. BANTA & S. THACKER, THE PREMATURE DELIVERY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY:
A CASE REPORT (1978), in which the authors assert that the uncertain benefits of electronic fetal
monitoring, and its associated costs (more than $300 million annually) and risks (including a
likely increase of 100,000 Caesarian sections per year with accompanying risks to the mother of
death and pelvic infections) do not seem to justify the technique's widespread use.
102. For a recent study indicating that adoption of technology often appears unrelated to
medical need, see L. RUSSELL, supra note 71, at 173, 175-76 in which the author observed that
adoption of cobalt therapy, electroencephalography, open-heart surgery and renal dialysis oc-
curred faster in areas in which the level of insurance coverage was higher and proceeded more
rapidly as that level grew. Further, she found that these technologies were more likely to be
adopted in such areas than in those areas with a higher incidence of related diseases. See also J.
CROMWELL, P. GINSBERG, D. HAMILTON & M. SUMMER, INCENTIVES AND DECISIONS UNDERLY-
ING HOSPITALS' ADOPTION OF MAJOR CAPITAL EQUIPMENT (1975).
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sional trade associations are coming under increasing scrutiny,"°3 tac-
tics such as the denial of hospital staff privileges to physicians affiliated
with an alternative delivery system are no longer available. Participat-
ing in the CON process may become a legally sanctioned substitute
tactic. This is true in Colorado, where, despite the general reluctance
of providers to contribute to the public debate over specific CON
projects, providers often break their silence when an innovative project
is submitted for CON review.
One Colorado example is especially noteworthy because a pivotal
issue in the deliberation-and the issue seized upon by the local physi-
cians-was the quality of care offered by the applicant. The project
being proposed was a for-profit opthalmologic clinic that would per-
form certain kinds of cataract surgery on an out-patient basis in compe-
tition with the local hospital. The owner of the clinic was also the
surgeon who would be performing the operations. Despite the doctor's
international recognition for his pioneering work in opthalmological
surgery and his years of practice at the local hospital without any ap-
parent problems, allegations were made, without further documenta-
tion, that the clinic might provide an inferior quality of care. In the
absence of data, allegations were traded between the proponents of the
clinic and those of the hospital. Notwithstanding a positive recommen-
dation by the HSA's staff, the HSA voted to recommend denial of the
project. Then, after lengthy debate at the state level, the HSA recom-
mendation was rejected and the CON was granted.
The unavailability of data on the quality of care issue in that case
was of crucial importance. Had it been available, it could have been
used to compare the performance of the would-be clinic owner with
that of his former colleagues at the hospital and his peers elsewhere in
Colorado (if not the nation), and it could have been used to evaluate
the performance of comparable clinics elsewhere in the nation vis-A-vis
the care being rendered in hospital settings for the same type of patient
and care. Some of the data in question-at least the portion pertaining
to the hospital-based activities-had already been collected by the local
PSRO. Because of current federal policy, however, that data was not
available to the CON decisionmakers, 1° and comparable data is not
103. See Iglehart, supra note 19. See also Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in
Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303.
104. HEW Proposed Rule on Confidentiality and Disclosure of Professional Standards Re-
view Organization (PSRO) Information, 44 Fed. Reg. 3058 (1979). But see Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, [1978 Transfer Binder] MEDI-
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collected or available through other sources.
Making decisions in such cases without adequate data is not only
difficult and potentially risky for the decisionmaker, but it is, simply
speaking, bad decisionmaking. Obviously, rational decisions require
information, especially when the decisionmaking process becomes sub-
ject to increasing political pressures as is now occurring in the health
care industry. That some of the information necessary for a viable
CON program has already been collected means that the task is less
monumental than some believe. The data, however, must be made
available or else the public will be forced to assume the cost of a dupli-
cative collection effort.
10 5
The lack of good demographic data is also of critical importance
because sound population estimates and projections, including those
relating to rate of growth, and a population's anticipated racial, age
and socio-economic characteristics and its rates of mortality and mor-
bidity, have great import for future planning decisions. Given the dy-
namic nature of community populations and the rapid change in health
delivery systems, health planning cannot be based on a static model.1
0 6
Absent definitive population projections, poor decisions will be made,
and they will be subject to well-deserved criticisms. Finally, popula-
tion-based utilization rates can be far more instructive regarding
problems in the delivery system than facility-based rates. Epidemio-
logical studies of health services utilization is a critical tool for an intel-
ligent health planning and regulatory system. Results from these
studies can indicate excessive utilization and surplus resources in com-
CARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 28,943 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 1978), in which Judge Gesell of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that PSROs were "public agen-
cies" within the meaning of the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and therefore were
required to release information to the public if so requested unless they could qualify for the
limited exclusions under FOIA for specific types of information on the basis, for example, of
confidentiality. The case is now on appeal.
105. See, e.g., National Governors' Association, The Report of the Committee on Health In-
formation for Policy Development (1978). The Committee identified two basic categories of
health information systems: "[i]ndividual systems developed primarily for the purpose of monitor-
ing compliance with governmental programs," and "[d]ata systems developed, irrespective of
compliance issues, for long-term planning and decisionmaking. Some of the major problems con-
cerning health data systems seem to arise from the fact that the two systems are rarely integrated."
Id. at 3. The report noted that great quantities of data are being collected at a substantial expense
(between $60 and $80 million annually for HEW alone) and that "all too often these data are not
translated into information [usable for program purposes] and not passed on to governmental or
private decisionmakers in a timely fashion." Id. at 4. The Committee recommends a national
health information system with ready access by both public and private users, and makes specific
proposals regarding the components of the system, the flow of data, and the accuracy, accessibility
and timeliness of data.
106. B. ABEL-SMITH, VALUE FOR MONEY IN HEALTH SERVICES 173 (1976).
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munities that, at first appearance, might seem to have appropriate occu-
pancy rates and lengths of stay in their facilities. Moreover,
population-based reviews are also indispensible in identifying real pub-
lic health problems. 107
E. CON Lacks Quality Control Mechanisms
At the present time, compliance with CON requirements, includ-
ing submitting a project for review and complying with representations
made on the application forms after the CON has been awarded, is
neither monitored nor enforced. Perhaps for the great majority of
providers this is unnecessary; voluntary compliance by a majority with
the chief provisions of a regulatory scheme is always a precondition to
the success of a regulatory program. But there are undoubtedly some
providers who would not feel compelled to comply with requirements
they find burdensome and useless. Furthermore, should CON reviews
become more stringent, with chances for success consequently becom-
ing less certain and the cost for preparing and presenting a CON appli-
cation increasing, total reliance on an honor system may become a
somewhat naive way to assure compliance with the terms of a review
process that involves such vast sums.1 8 The tight-lipped provider com-
munity, behaving much like the proverbial physicians in the operating
room with their "conspiracy of silence," will rarely inform on one an-
other. At the present time, provider gossip is the sole source of infor-
mation to the CON agency about "end runs," since there is no audit of
providers that would detect such evasive efforts, even under the cost
determinations of Medicare, Medicaid or private insurers. Thus, there
is no way to estimate the extent of this problem.
If a CON application is submitted and rejected, assuring compli-
ance with the negative decision is also a matter of some concern. It is,
however, the one aspect of this area that has received attention. HEW
is now requiring states, as a precondition for full SHPDA designation
107. For instance, when a community is identified with a utilization rate for chest-related
ailments markedly higher than for other communities with similar demographic characteristics, an
investigation would examine the reasons for the disparity, including the possibility that the higher
utilizing community suffers from an infectious, hereditary or environmentally related disease. See
Wennberg & Gittelsohn, supra note 23. See also J. ROBBINS, THE USES OF POPULATION-BASeD
DATA FOR RATE SFTTING (1976).
108. If the CON review process were administered in every state pursuant to federal require-
ments, it would have reviewed projects during 1978 totalling $6.8 billion. Hospital Cost Contain-
ment Act of 1977- Hearings on S. 1391 Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of
the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 839, 891 (1977) (statement of Alice
M. Rivlin, Director, Congressional Budget Office) [hereinafter cited as 1977 11earings].
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under P.L. 93-641, to possess adequate sanctions to enforce negative
CON decisions, 0 9 and third-party payors, most notably several Blue
Cross plans," 0 have assisted CON reviewers in enforcing their
decisions.
Once a CON has been granted, there is little continued monitoring
to see if the applicant has complied with the terms of the CON project
application. Frequently, the basis for a decision granting or denying a
CON can be found in the specific assurances made in the application-
for example, that the equipment will be purchased at a given price, that
the charge for the service will be lower than that prevailing in the com-
munity, or that outreach efforts will be made to medically underserved
areas. At present, however, little is done to ensure that these conditions
are ultimately met. Even reports of cost overruns, for which many
CON statutes require a subsequent approval, are now submitted chiefly
on a voluntary basis and, at least in Colorado, are submitted more fre-
quently by the smaller, rural facilities, which are not the primary target
of the CON cost-containment, than by the large urban facilities with
advanced accounting systems.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
CON programs must be overhauled if they are to attain the stated
purpose of helping to make the American health care system more ef-
fective, efficient and equitable. Experience indicates that, without ex-
tensive changes, the successes of the CON program will be few and far
between and will be largely attributable to circumstances in which
there is a dedicated agency, a substantial data base, an established tra-
dition of intervention in the health delivery system, and a politically
supportive environment-a cluster of factors neither present generally
in the nation at this time nor likely to occur in the foreseeable future."'
109. 42 C.F.R. § 123.405 (1977).
110. Blue Cross plans in Kansas City and Cincinnati have been especially active in this aslist-
ance. Over 20 plans have provisions in their reimbursement contracts with participating hospitals
stating that the plan will not cover the costs of a project that has failed to receive planning agency
approval. For a more detailed description of the aggressive steps taken by Blue Cross of Kansas
City to reduce a controversial proposal from 120 new acute care beds to 40 in an area where there
already was a documented excess of beds, see BLUE CROSS-BLUE SHIELD ASSOCIATIONS, THE
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD CONSUMERS EXCHANGE (1978). For an evaluation suggesting
that Blue Cross plans may increasingly act in pro-consumer fashion in the future, see Schonbrun,
The Future of Blue Cross, 2 J. HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 319 (1977).
111. Singled out for special attention have been such areas as Rochester, New York, where
Kodak, Xerox and the University of Rochester have historically joined forces with elements of the
consumer and provider community. Detroit (with the "big three" auto makers, the United Auto
Workers, the University of Michigan and a traditionally progressive state government), Cincinnati
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Consequently, what is needed are solutions tailored to the more typical
circumstances that now confront most CON agencies. The strategies
must seek to impose efficiency, economy, quality control and accounta-
bility on the CON system, and, whenever possible, they should be self-
enforcing. Existing competitive pressures among providers should be
relied upon whenever appropriate. Approaches designed to raise the
public consciousness about costs should be sought. At the same time,
proposed solutions should aim to provide the CON programs with suf-
ficient political support and with appropriate incentives to carry out
their responsibilities with vigor even in the face of advancing technol-
ogy, the continuing political power of those supporting the status quo,
the present lack of data, and the questionable quality of existing health
service plans and review criteria.
With these objectives in mind, the remainder of this article will
outline several proposals for reforming the CON system. First, a series
of general reforms will be discussed, and then the following specific
proposals will be examined in greater detail: (1) imposing on states an
annual lid on new health-related capital expenditures; (2) requiring
that a project first be cited in the facility's long-range plan before it can
be considered for a CON; (3) providing for partial and conditional ap-
provals; (4) applying the doctrine of res judicata to projects that are
similar to proposals already rejected and the doctrine of the "substan-
tial evidence" rule to CON appeals; and (5) imposing time-limited
and/or site-limited moratoria on projects based on new medical
technologies.
A. Streamlining the Process: General Suggestions for Reform
As in other license and permit procedures, the burden of proof in
the CON process should be on the applicant. Yet, many current state
statutes are vague or ambiguous on this point. In practice, it is fre-
quently the CON decisionmaker who carries the true burden of show-
ing that a proposed projec'. should be rejected because it will not meet a
community need as expressed by existing plans and criteria. The provi-
sions of P.L. 93-641 help address this ambiguity, at least for new hospi-
(with an especially progressive Blue Cross plan, Proctor & Gamble and progressive city leader-
ship), and Phoenix (with Motorola and a well-respected, long-tenured HSA director) have also
been named. They are the exceptions that prove the rule, for there are few structural similarities
among these cities, much less anything that could be readily transferred to other parts of the
country.
1979] 1289
NORTH CA4ROLINA LAW REVIEW [
tal in-patient services,"12 by requiring that the CON decisionmaker
affirmatively make a series of findings regarding need. Despite this im-
provement, the issue of burden of proof is still unclear and should be
resolved. Rigor in applying an appropriate burden of proof will not
only aid the efforts of the CON review agency, but also may change the
applicant's behavior and subsequently its willingness to consider, when
necessary, appropriate alterations to an already submitted application.
Information is an indispensible tool for adequate planning and
regulation. Data that is both demographic-based and facility-specific
(especially regarding quality of care costs) can be obtained through an
improved data collection and dissemination effort. Much data is al-
ready available and in the possession of such quasi-public agencies as
PSROs and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAH), as well as state and federal Medicaid and Medicare agencies,
but has not been aggregated or released to health planning or CON
programs." 13
A code of ethics must be established for CON reviewers, both to
guide their efforts and to shield them from inappropriate political
pressures.
In the interest of improving the system's accountability, reducing
the costs (both economic and social) of compliance, and making its de-
cisions more consistent and more rigorous, there should be a unified
CON administrative review process and a single definitive CON deci-
sionmaker. Under such a system, responsibility for breakdowns could
be clearly assigned, and interested parties, such as concerned consumer
groups and other providers, could concentrate their efforts on a single
proceeding. Applicants could focus their efforts toward satisfying the
concerns of only one decisionmaker, thus eliminating the "whipsaw"
effects that may now occur in the present system-either of the appli-
cant by the HSA and the state agency (for example, the reviewing agen-
cies making incompatible demands of the applicant) or of the
reviewing agencies by the applicant (for example, the proponent play-
ing off one agency against the other).
Furthermore, this unified CON review process should be a state
operated system.' 14 Despite the role played by the federal government
112. 42 C.F.R. § 123.410 (1977).
113. See notes 104 & 105 supra.
114. For a review of the increasing federal support for the concept of a larger voice for states
in health policy formation and administration, see Iglehart Carving Out a Rolefor Slates in Con-
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in establishing CON programs, they are basically state administered.
Legal assistance, increasingly necessary as the CON and health plan-
ning system grows more litigious, is provided through each state attor-
ney general's office.' 15 The governor, with power over the tenure of
ranking agency officials, and the state legislature, with control over
funding appropriations for the program, can effectively monitor and,
when necessary, correct abuses in the operations of the CON programs.
Coordination with other related regulatory reviews, including facility
licensure and hospital rate review (in those states where it exists), can
only be effected at the state level."1
6
Giving the HSAs or other quasi-public bodies the power to make
final CON decisions would create several problems. Because HSAs are
generally sub-state entities, problems regarding intrastate consistency
would be likely-a potentially troublesome occurrence, particularly
since states continue to be the most frequently used political bounda-
ries for health decisionmaking and data collection." 7 Most HSAs op-
erate without specific state enabling legislation, and many continue to
suffer from inadequate consumer involvement and, consequently, in-
sufficient political accountability." 8 In many states, such as New York,
their relationship to other ongoing state regulatory review programs
has reportedly been one of competition and/or avoidance. The HSA's
trolling Hospital Costs, 10 NAT'L J. 1045 (1978). See also Somers & Somers, supra note 24, at 154-
55 for support for the idea that the state should play the dominant role in CON.
115. The comments of an attorney who represents several California HSAs are illustrative:
From the HSAs' perspective, perhaps the key issue is one of too many lawyers or, to put
the matter more accurately, the issue is the gross disparity between the vast amount of
legal resources available, on the one hand, to the health industry and the relatively small
amount of legal time available to the HSAs, on the other.... As part of the [hospital]
industry strategy, any planning activity perceived as an undesired constraint on expan-
sion of the industry is translated into an issue to be resolved in a legal forum such as a
court or the legislature. Virtually all effective acts on the part of health planners are so
perceived. In short, the health planning process has been so legalized that agencies with-
out legal resources have little, if any, role in the final decision-making process ...
[H]ealth planners, because they have lost almost all their legal battles, have been intimi-
dated in their pursuit of planning options, and the HSAs in this state at least have be-
come growingly isolated from any significant role in CON determinations.
S. Price, Health Planning and the Law 7-9 (speech delivered at the National Health Lawyers'
Association Conference, October 27, 1978).
116. See generally MILLER & BRYNE, INC. & JPB ASSOCIATES, INC., FINAL REPORT: EVALUA-
TION OF THE IMPACT OF PHS PROGRAMS ON STATE HEALTH GOALS AND ACTIVITIES (Health
Resources Administration, Washington, D.C. 1977); Altman, The Politics of Health Care Regula-
tion: The Case of the National Health Planning andResources Development Act, 2 J. HEALTH POL.,
PoL'y & L. 560 (1978).
117. National Governors' Conference Center for Policy Research Analysis, Making the Na-
tional Health Planning Law Work: The State Perspective (1977).
118. See, e.g., Texas Acorn v. Texas Area 5 Health Systems Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019 (5th
Cir. 1977).
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"voluntary" approach to problem solving based on a consensus model
of decisionmaking and its proximity to "grassroots" concerns of access
rather than systemic cost-containment make rigorous CON decision-
making exceedingly difficult. '" 9 At present there are no comprehensive
comparisons of the CON performance by HSAs vis-A-vis that of state
agencies,' 20 but in Colorado, at least, CON reviews performed by
HSAs have tended to be less rigorous and less sensitive to cost-contain-
ment concerns than those conducted by the state. 121
The HSAs, however, could play a productive role under a unified
system that would be very appropriate for these regional planning bod-
ies. Specifically, the HSAs could provide more technical assistance to
applicants, stimulate new CON applications to address current commu-
nity needs, and serve as an "honest broker" between the applicant and
the state CON review agency. The HSAs could also monitor the con-
formity of CON decisions with the various plans being generated under
the provisions of P.L. 93-641-plans that HSAs play a dominant role in
formulating. Under the present system, with its redundancy of func-
tions, neither the SHPDA nor the HSA has had the staff or the time
necessary to perform any of these important tasks adequately.
Finally, HSAs could serve as a "backstop" for the CON system.
In instances such as that in Ohio when the state CON review agency
fails to carry out its duties in a responsible way,'22 the HSAs within a
state could-singly or collectively-be authorized by HEW to take over
the role as the CON decisionmaker for the state.
Plans and criteria should be formally promulgated as regulations
under the state's APA before they are relied upon by the CON deci-
sionmaker. A federal court in Nebraska recently reversed a negative
decision rendered by the state CON decisionmaker because it failed to
119. See generally A. Wildavsky, Can Health Be Planned? (1976 Davis Lecture, University of
Chicago Graduate School of Business).
120. The survey now being conducted by the American Health Planning Association may
provide the base data for such a comparison. See note 37 svra.
121. See, e.g., Colorado Dep't of Health, Annual Report of the Health Facilities Advisory
Council (1978). See also Altman, supra note 116, at 572-73 (citing seven recent reversals in a six
month period of HSA decisions by the state CON decisionmaker in Massachusetts).
122. See H. Foley, Report of the Health Resources Administrator (HEW, Washington, D.C.
1978). The report notes that the Administrator of HRA threatened the state CON agency, the
Ohio Department of Health, with loss of its SHPDA designation and potentially other HEW
funding if it did not improve its CON performance. The Ohio agency had overturned, without
explanation, two negative HSA recommendations on multi-million dollar hospital expansion
projects in Cincinnati and Dayton.
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have its criteria properly adopted.'23 The court made this ruling even
though the state agency was operating only under the authority of the
1122 program, 124 whereby it rendered not a final decision but only a
recommendation to HEW, and even though the 1122 statute and regu-
lations themselves contain criteria of much detail and specificity, which
would tend to obviate the need for further rulemaking. In New Jersey,
where the courts have granted state authorities considerable latitude in
conducting the CON program, rulemaking has also been widely re-
garded as a basic precondition for a legally sound CON system.'
25
Finally, proponents of a strong CON system will find that they can
bolster their authority over the health system through rulemaking ef-
forts. Courts are more inclined to defer to the expertise of administra-
tive agencies and to allow those agencies broader discretion when they
engage in actions that have a general effect and are only prospec-
tive in nature (rulemaking) than when they engage in actions that affect
the rights of specific parties and are retrospective in nature
(adjudications).
2 6
B. Living Within a Budget: Setting an Annual Lid on Capital
Expenditures
During the past two years increasing attention has been paid to the
concept of capping the nation's health expenditures. 27 In Rhode Is-
123. Nebraska Methodist Hosp. v. Casari, [1978 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH) 1 29,205 (D. Neb. Aug. 18, 1978).
124. Id.
125. See generally Cooper River Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Dougherty, 133 N.J. Super. 226,
336 A.2d 35 (1975) (upholding legality of 18-month moratorium on construction of intermediate
care facilities promulgated as regulation by regular body of state government, the Health Care
Administration Board).
126. See generally Northwest Hosp. v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Bd., 59 Ill. App. 3d
221, 375 N.E.2d 1327 (1978). The court observed that the standard for reviewing the determina-
tions of an administrative agency varies with the nature of the action taken:
"When an administrative agency exercises its rulemaking powers, it is performing a
quasi-legislative (as opposed to a quasi-judicial) function. This fundamental principle
explains the discrepancy in the standards of judicial review of each type of proceeding;
that is, when dealing with an adjudicatory proceeding, a reviewing court may only set
aside the agency decision if it is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence.
When reviewing administrative rules and regulations, on the other hand, a court may not
invalidate the regulation unless it is clearly arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, be-
cause administrative agencies are inherently more qualified to decide technical problems
and the mechanics of dealing with them. Because the courts lack the expertise possessed
by administrative agencies, they should hesitate to find a regulation unreasonable."
Id. at 226-27, 375 N.E.2d at 1331-32 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 37 Ill. App.
3d 264, 270-71, 346 N.E.2d 212, 218 (1976)).
127. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. S2216 (daily ed. March 7, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Javitts).
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land a consortium of public and private agencies sought to impose a
"maxicap" on total expenditures in all hospitals of the state. 28 A simi-
lar voluntary effort is now underway in Rochester, New York.129 In the
Hospital Cost Containment Bill of 1978, President Carter proposed that
limits on expenditures be imposed in two distinct areas of rising costs:
capital expenditures were to be limited to $2.5 billion annually, with
allocations assigned to each state based on population, while increases
in a facility's operating costs were to be kept, subject to tightly drawn
exceptions, within a 9% cap.1 3 1 In 1979 a new federal cost containment
bill was introduced, designed to set the lid on capital expenditures at $3
billion and on operating expenses at 9.7 percent.' 3' New York has
been contemplating a lid on new capital expenditures alone, believing
it too difficult, both technically and politically, to impose a cap on oper-
ating costs.
132
The implications for CON reviews of imposing a capital expendi-
ture limit are significant. By establishing an overall budget for capital
expenditures, several positive effects should result. First, the substan-
tial capital expenditures and operating costs that accompany new
projects would be significantly curtailed. The $2.5 billion lid originally
proposed by President Carter was estimated to be approximately fifty
percent of the total spent the previous year on capital expenditures. 33
Additional savings in operating costs would also be substantial inas-
much as it has been estimated that the annual operating costs that ac-
company a new capital expenditure range between twenty and one
hundred percent of the total cost of the capital expenditure itself.'
34
Second, by setting the lid at a specific figure that is high enough to
be responsive to demonstrated needs yet low enough to result in cost
savings, the concept of "relative need" can be introduced into the CON
128. See generally Zimmerman, Buechner & Thornberry, Prospectipe Reimbursement in Rhode
Island. Additional Perspectives, 14 INQUIRY 3 (1977).
129. Sorenson & Saward, An Alternate Approach to Hospital Cost Control" The Rochester Pro-
ject, 93 PUB. HEALTH REP. 311 (1978).
130. Several bills were introduced during the 1978 congressional session. The most prominent
were S. 1391, introduced by Sen. Edward Kennedy (D. Mass.), and H.R. 9717 and H.R. 5285,
introduced by Rep. Paul Rogers (D. Florida). Seegeneraly HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINIS-
TRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HOSPITAL COST CONTAINMENT: A
SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION PENDING BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES (1978).
131. 125 CONG. REC. S2207 (daily ed. March 7, 1979).
132. See generall, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF HEALTH SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT & NEW
YORK STATE HEALTH PLANNING COMMISSION, BRIEFING BOOK: THE CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
LIMIT PROGRAM (1978) [hereinafter cited as NEW YORK STATE BRIEFING BOOK].
133. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 108, at 892.
134. See Somers & Somers, supra note 24, at 153-54.
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review system.' 35 This concept brings an element of discipline into the
health care system by forcing CON reviewers to recognize that while
virtually any project may be found to benefit some people, 36 some
projects will prove more beneficial to the population at large, and be-
cause of the growing constraint on resources should be given priority.
For example, a project that provides primary care services to a medi-
cally underserved population such as migrant workers or inner-city
families should be granted a higher priority 37 than a tertiary care pro-
ject involving a new piece of medical equipment of untested efficiency,
effectiveness or safety capable of serving relatively few patients and
yielding no meaningful research findings.
138
Under this system, the inclination of CON reviewers to say yes to
a project of limited or unknown value would decrease, 139 for several
reasons. With a limited budget, approving a marginal project may
force CON reviewers to disapprove a more deserving project later in
the year; consequently, proponents of projects (especially those submit-
ted early in the year) will have to meet their burden of proof. Providers
themselves may find it necessary to testify against projects of other
providers to preserve funds in the system for their own projects. This
would help to generate a favorable political environment for CON re-
viewers that would be more conducive to saying no than the present
one marked by its "logrolling" efforts.'40 This environment might also
help produce useful critiques of projects that often can be prepared
only by another facility. What the market has failed to produce and
what the antitrust laws have, to date, failed to remedy may instead be
fostered by an annual cap on CON expenditures.
Furthermore, under such competitive circumstances, a full reli-
135. See NEw YORK STATE BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 132, at 5-11.
136. In some instances, as with convenience items for physicians, the benefit may fall prima-
rily on the providers themselves.
137. "Over a third of America's children, especially those who are poor or are members of
minority groups, are not immunized against childhood diseases; thus, epidemics of diphtheria and
measles still occur with unpleasant frequency." Silver, Health Services for Children, YALE
ALUMNI MAGAZINE & J., February 1979, at 14.
138. Seegeneral A. COCHRANE, supra note 98. Cochrane notes the need to conduct rigorous
effectiveness trials on new methodologies for the delivery of care before introduction to the gen-
eral market. The treatment of research oriented projects received little attention in the congres-
sional hearings held prior to the passage of Pub. L. No. 93-641.
139. See, e.g., H. Cohen, New Princoles of Reimbursement for Capital Costs, Geared to HSA
and SHPDA4 Plans, in LINKING HEALTH PLANNING AND REGULATION To INCREASE COST EF-
FECTIVENESS, supra note 54, at 8-12; NEw YORK STATE BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 132, at 11.
140. See generally Nelson & Winter, In Search ofa Useful Theory ofInnovation, 6 RESEARCH
POL'Y 36 (1977).
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ance on health plans for CON decisionmaking would be less necessary
because a more complete record would be developed based on the in-
formed comments provided by rival institutions. 14 1 Substantive com-
ments from competing providers would supplement the established
plans and criteria if they were comprehensive and of good quality or
help supplant them if they were overly narrow, biased or of poor quali-
ty. This feedback would also be useful in examining the quality of
prepared plans and criteria indicating areas requiring revision or
wholesale change.
If a federal cost containment bill were enacted, an annual lid of
$2.5 or $3 billion would be instituted for all proposed capital expendi-
tures nationwide. Allocations of the total amount would be made on a
state-by-state basis according to population. Further allocations could
be made by state officials according to health service area or other sub-
state geographical unit. State CON reviewers would presumably ad-
minister the capital expenditure lid. Such an arrangement might have
considerable utility. The state officials, midway between the pressures
of local communities and local providers on one hand and the federal
government on the other, could make tough but still well-informed de-
cisions. The state CON program could benefit from having to operate
within a budgeting constraint, but its officials would not have to take
the political heat for its existence or its level. Even if the CON program
were to become an increasingly state-operated program as recom-
mended above, cost-containment considerations would be accorded
great weight, if for no other reason than the financial pressures that
rising Medicaid and health insurance coverage costs for the large work
force of state employees continue to place on state budgets and conse-
quently on state taxes.1
42
141. See, e.g., Olathe Hosp. Foundation v. Extendicare, Inc., 217 Kan. 546, 539 P.2d 1 (1975).
In Olathe, two nonprofit hospitals challenged a CON proposal by a for-profit hospital chain to
establish a new 400 bed facility almost midway between them. Several recent cases in New Jersey,
where batching of applications is an established practice, are also of interest. See, e.g., National
Nephrology Foundation v. Dougherty, 138 N.J. Super. 470, 351 A.2d 392 (1976) (one CON
awarded to establish an intermediate renal dialysis facility although three applications reviewed
concurrently). See also Saint Joseph's Hosp. v. Finley, 153 N.J. Super. 214, 379 A.2d 467 (1977),
cert. denied, 75 NJ. 595, 384 A.2d 825 (1978). In Saint Joseph's, a CON for a cardiac surgery
program was denied on the ground that only two of nine facilities presently offering the service in
the region met a minimum standard utilized by the CON decisionmaker. Although the cardiac
surgery standard used had not been promulgated as a regulation, the court found that sufficient
credible evidence existed in the record. Id. at 222, 379 A.2d at 470. The court's opinion is silent
on the role played by the nine other facilities, but it is clear that information on the utilization of
the other hospitals' services-whether volunteered by the other facilities or solicited by the review-
ers-played a critical role in establishing the necessary credible evidence.
142. In Massachusetts, for example, a $90 million increase in Medicaid expenditures between
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Several states may not wait for federal action. Officials in New
York and Maryland have capital expenditure programs under active
consideration.' 43 Like the pending federal legislation, the state pro-
grams would establish relative need as the context for all CON deci-
sions and would consequently affect the behavior of CON reviewers,
providers and other interested parties. A lid thus enacted at the state
level might have greater perceived legitimacy to the general public and
the provider community than one passed in Washington. Greater sen-
sitivity to unique local conditions, such as the rapid population growth
in parts of the West and South requiring new construction projects or
the aging physical plants of established medical centers in the urban
Northeast requiring extensive renovation work to meet building and
fire code requirements, might also make the lid established for a state
or sub-state region more appropriate than one based strictly on present
state population figures. Nonetheless, a federal overview of state estab-
fished capital expenditure limits might be necessary and appropriate if
only to assure that the total sum of the state lids did not exceed an
acceptable national level.
Determining the actual level of the lid will necessarily involve an
element of arbitrariness and negotiation, not only because the human
need for health care and its desired and presumed end-product-good
health-is difficult to value,'" but also because the tools to evaluate the
impact of capital expenditures on total actual health expenditures are
currently very imprecise. If the nation decided that it wanted to place a
iealth services, one percent for research,' 46 one percent for
7 and 1978, from $630 million to $720 million, represented more than one-half of
n increase in the state budget during that period, with 73% of these expenditures
hospital and nursing homes, the target of CON and other P.L. 93-641 functions.
note 116, at 569-70.
g., H. Cohen, supra note 139; NEw YORK STATE BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 132,
,neralyv Knowles, The Responsibility ofthe Individual, 106 DAEDALUS 57 (Winter
M. LALONDE, A NEw PERSPECTIVE ON THE HEALTH OF CANADIANS (1974).
pproach assumes a constraint on both capital expenditures and operating revenues.
f the corollary benefits of establishing a lid on capital expenditures and conse-
-ct health services would be to help preserve adequate funding for research and
.that now face serious cutbacks as a result of the burgeoning Medicare and Medi-
id the present drive to establish a balanced federal budget. See, for example, the
it by Sen. Edward Kennedy:
health care costs have also hampered the ability of Federal and State govern-
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teaching new health professionals and one percent for public health
education), no one could calculate with any certainty how much in cap-
ital expenditures should be allowed in a specific year to reach the thir-
teen percent level. This would be true because of the varying and
unpredictable level of operating costs that are associated with capital
expenditure projects.
The arbitrariness necessarily involved in setting the level of the lid
has just recently been illustrated by the federal government. In 1978
the level of the federal lid proposed was $2.5 billion, a figure estimated
as being one-half of the nation's capital expenditures for health facili-
ties and services during the preceding year. As stated earlier, for 1979
the Carter Administration's latest proposal is for a lid of $3 billion-an
increase of nearly seventeen percent (approximately twice the rate of
the Consumer Price Index during the same period). The amount of the
increase has undoubtedly been prompted as much by political consid-
erations (if $2.5 billion failed to get congressional approval, then per-
haps $3 billion will succeed) as by any recalculation of the nation's
health needs.
Officials in New York have been considering a range of ap-
proaches from using, on the low side, the average amount approved
annually during the last three years under the state's CON program
(estimated at $250 million per year) to, on the high side, the annualized
cost of replacing needed facilities (approximately $400-500 million)
with ten percent of the statewide cap held back by the state for discre-
tionary purposes.
147
While some experimentation on this subject may be worthwhile,
implementation of such an approach should not be delayed solely be-
cause there is no unanimity among policy experts on the ideal level of
an imposed lid. As in setting any budget, some arbitrariness is una-
voidable. Once an initial level for the lid has been set, marginal altera-
ments to meet other pressing social problems. For example, between 1966 and 1978, the
HEW health budget increased from $3 to $44.5 billion. Of this increase, $37.3 billion has
gone to pay for benefits under medicare and medicaid, with only $4.2 billion left over for
expansion of other governmental health activities beyond their 1966 level....
Tragically, we are pouring so much money into hospitals right now for extra beds,
for unneeded tests, for unnecessary surgery that we have not had money to spend on
basic preventive health care. It is more humane, and it would be a lot less expensive, to
prevent illness than to put someone into a hospital to cure them.
125 CONG. REc. S2214 (daily ed. March 7, 1979).
147. A provision to exceed the cap if the state commissioner of health finds that the lives and
safety of patients would otherwise be endangered is also included in the New York plan. Nnw
YORK STATE BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 132, at 14. The New York plan identifies large multi-
year projects as potential beneficiaries of the 10% discretionary fund. Id. at 10-1I.
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tions can be legislated and an indexing system could be used to peg
future increases to, for example, rises in the Consumer Price Index or
another appropriate index.
Less useful, but also possible, would be a flexible, non-binding
guideline on capital expenditures. These guidelines might be adopted
by CON programs without further legislative authorization. A self-im-
posed lid could serve a useful purpose as a continuing reminder to the
CON reviewers that funds for health services are not unlimited and
that relative need should be considered. Whether the CON reviewers
would have the discipline to utilize consistently such a guideline as a
decisionmaking tool, and whether providers would feel sufficiently con-
strained by the existence of the guideline to compete effectively against
one another is difficult to predict.
While the constitutionality of CON programs has been generally
upheld, a statutorily enacted cap on capital expenditures would un-
doubtedly be challenged and, due to the across-the-board impact on all
providers, would present the courts with a more difficult question. 4 '
148. The constitutionality of regulations pertaining to costs as well as quality in the private
health care sector has been repeatedly upheld by state and federal courts during the past decade,
most recently by the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano,
435 U.S. 962 (1978), af'g mem., 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977). The Court affirmed without
opinion a lower court decision that the certificate of need provisions of P.L. 93-641, which require
that each state enact a CON law in conformity with federal requirements or suffer the loss of
grant-in-aid funds for specific federal health programs, did not violate the first, fifth or ninth
amendments to the United States Constitution by seeking to "convert private facilities into public
facilities subject to federal regulation and 'interfer[ing] with the physician-patient relationship by
rationing health resources for reasons unrelated to the promotion of high quality care."' 445 F.
Supp. 532, 533 (E.D.N.C. 1977), afl'dmem, 435 U.S. 962 (1978) (emphasis added).
In its opinion, the district court, noting that there were no "real issues of contested fact" and
that "the dispositive issues are legal," id. at 533-34, observed that if CON covered only "public
construction"
the public interest in avoiding unnecessary increases in health care by reason of the
addition of unneeded additional facilities could be thwarted by private construction. For
this reason, every court which has considered the constitutional validity of state certifi-
cate of need laws has found. . . the inclusion of private construction within the law's
coverage valid and reasonable, save in the North Carolina case [Aston Park] already
cited.
Id. at 536. The court thus found it necessary to an effective CON program to cover private as well
as public health facilities if the "public interest" of cost-containment was to be addressed in a
meaningful way. It barely mentioned that private investment decisions in the health industry
about development and expansion would be curtailed by governmental decisionmaking. Further,
the court did not rely on quality of care considerations to bolster its ruling, even though quality of
care has long been an area in which the state's power to regulate the private health industry has
been uncontested, and it is now commonly understood that avoiding duplicative health services
often will have a significant and beneficial impact on quality as well as costs. Finally, the court
found that there was no basis for the claim that CON constituted an unlawful invasion of the
patient-doctor relationship. Id. For other cases supporting the constitutionality of CON laws, see
Simon v. Cameron, 337 F. Supp. 1380 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Merry Heart Nursing & Convalescent
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Nonetheless, were the Congress or a state legislature to find the estab-
lishment of a lid on capital expenditures to be necessary to contain
costs, and were the lid reasonable and based on factors such as those
being weighed in New York, then the reasoning relied on in recent
judicial decisions upholding CON programs in general should still be
sufficient to uphold the validity of a properly enacted capital lid. 4 9
Home v. Dougherty, 131 N.J. Super. 412,330 A.2d 370 (1974); Attoma v. Dep't of Social Welfare,
26 App. Div. 12, 270 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1966). But see In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp.,
282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973).
149. An interesting problem might be created if Congress enacted a national lid and a state,
either before the federal enactment (as perhaps in New York or Maryland) or after it (if, for
example, a state legislature in a western state believed that the federal formula for allocating
expenditures failed to give due regard to its projected population growth), passed a capital expen-
diture lid whose provisions were inconsistent with the terms of the federal act. An uncritical
reading of the recent decision in Park East Corp. v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
which involved a small private hospital in New York City, would suggest that, despite the tradi-
tional hegemony of the states in the area of health care regulation, federal preemption of the state
lid might now result. The hospital in Park East challenged a delicensure action instituted against
it by the state health department on the grounds that it was actually a decertification action and
that the specific procedures for such actions mandated under P.L. 93-641 had not been complied
with. The state licensing agency, which was also the SHPDA, asserted that not only were its
actions based on relevant licensure factors-specific violations of state quality of care standards-
but that even if it were seeking to decertify the hospital for cost-containment reasons this action
was authorized under the state's own decertification statute. The court ruled in favor of the hospi-
tal, holding that P.L. 93-641 had preempted the state's decertification process and, for all intents
and purposes, its delicensure powers as well, because their efforts had been "motivated by a desire
to eliminate excess hospital beds in New York State in contravention of the Act." Id. at 50.
The Park East opinion is troubling and, I believe, wrong for several reasons. First, nowhere
in the legislative history of P.L. 93-641 is there any indication that Congress intended a federal
preemption of all state initiatives in the field of health planning (§ 1526 of the Act even expressly
authorizes special grants for states to conduct rate review experiments). Second, any hospital
under threat of closure for reasons relating to poor quality care could invoke Park East if it
happened to be located in an area deemed to have a surplus of beds (as most areas of the country
are now believed to have). It could seek injunctive relief to prevent any state delicensure action
for as long as the HSA takes to render a decision on the "appropriateness" of the facility in
question. This could take a minimum of several years. Thus, the state's authority to regulate
hospitals and ensure their compliance with state health and hospital codes could be seriously
undermined, despite language in Park East, id. at 55, specifically stating that its decision would
not affect the state's "inherent police powers" to ensure quality of care in health facilities.
The present status of Park East is unclear. It has been widely criticized, but has not been
appealed by the state. While it appears to be a poorly decided case, if it does signal a new willing-
ness on the part of federal courts to give such overriding deference to federal enactments, then the
long-time domination of the states in the field of health care that began to erode with the passage
of Medicare and Medicaid may be crumbling further.
Should the Park East ruling prove persuasive to other federal courts, the provisions of the
federal lid would, whenever the state law was inconsistent or silent, take priority. If the case is
given a more narrow reading and limited to situations in which the state officials may not have
had clean hands, then a different result may be reached. The'states might argue that the ninth
amendment grants the states sovereign authority in this area. See, e.g., the short shrift given to the
ninth amendment argument in North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532
(E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'dmem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978). But see Wing & Silton, ConstitutionalAuthority
for Extending Federal Control Over the Delivery of Health Care, this Symposium, at text accompa-
nying notes 72-112.
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C The Plan's the Thing. Relating an Applicant's Long Range Plan to
Its CON Projects
Requiring that a facility include any proposed CON project, ex-
cept for emergencies, in an institutional plan operational for at least
one year in advance has significant merit. 5 ' By providing notice be-
yond what is now offered in some states by the letter of intent, 15 1 it
alerts the CON reviewers and planners to the possible need for devel-
oping or updating review criteria or plan sections related to the pro-
posed project.
If it is a public document,' 52 the institutional plan also alerts other
providers to the facility's intentions, opening the way for negotiations
among the community's providers to offer jointly the service in ques-
To the extent that the sanctions levied against those hospitals that violate the federal law are
limited to Medicare (a totally federal program) and Medicaid (a mixed state-federal program
under which the federal government assumes a majority of the program's costs), then it is likely,
following the reasoning of North Carolina ex rel Morrow v. Callfano, that the federal law would
supersede the state's. The court in Morrow upheld the right of the federal government to attach
conditions to health grants made to the states under federal health programs. This reasoning
would certainly apply to the federal Medicaid funds. As for Medicare, this program is totally
under federal control-both financially and administratively-and consequently the Congress can
apparently make whatever policy decisions regarding the program that it deems proper.
150. See generally Massachusetts Department of Health, Massachusetts Hospital One and
Five Year Plan FY 1978-1982, Vol. L Background and Purpose, (1977). Massachusetts requires
both a one-year and a five-year plan, although only the one-year plan is binding for CON reviews.
Here is a description of the two documents:
The one year plan is a formal planning document setting forth the actions which the
hospital plans to take in the forthcoming fiscal year in furtherance of the five year plan
being submitted at the same time. This plan shaU, at a minimum, identify all projects
planned for the forthcoming fiscal year which will require a determination of need; pres-
ent data supporting the need for each planned project; estimate the impact of each
planned project upon current utilization patterns; state the relationship of each planned
project to the hospital's five year plan; report on the progress and impact to date of
projects undertaken pursuant to determinations of need granted within the last five years
(or earlier in the case of any projects which have not yet been completed and in opera-
tion for two years); and include the capital and operating budget for the hospital during
the forthcoming fiscal year.
The five year plan shall be a formal planning document projecting the purpose and goals
of the hospital for at least the next five years in light of the major health care require-
ments of the population within the hospital's service area. The plan shall, at a minimum,
describe the hospital's planning process; give a demographic profile of the hospital's
service area, and identify major health care requirements of the population describe the
physical plant and the services of the hospital with patient origin and utilization data by
major services; estimate the impact of major external forces upon the hospital's services;
identify alternative courses of action, with preferences or selections stated and reasons
given for each; identify preferred or selected courses of action which might require a
determination of need; and describe the procedure to be followed in assessing the likely
impact of the preferred or selected courses of action.
Id. at 1. See also Medeiros, supra note 54.
151. Regarding the 1122 program, see 42 C.F.R. § 100.106(a)(l) (1978).
152. Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 300m-l(b)(6) (1976), public access to the files of the
SHPDA is guaranteed.
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tion or to arrange for a trade-off of services among the facilities. This
would be more likely if a capital expenditure limit were also imposed.
Other facilities can also better prepare critiques of the project with suf-
ficient advance time, or else schedule their own competing applications
for the service in question and thus open up the prospects for "batch-
ing." Batching offers the possibility of comparing the relative merits of
several comparable projects all seeking to address the same community
need when the community's need can be adequately filled by any one
of the proposed projects. 153 Here as elsewhere, competitive forces can
supplement the effectiveness of the CON regulatory scheme.
In addition, an institutional plan is likely to improve the internal
planning capabilities of health facilities-long a neglected area even
though other large and complex economic organizations in the nation
have bolstered their planning capabilities. 15 4  Such planning efforts
should also be useful in providing administrators and trustees with in-
creased management control over the institution's future vis-A-vis the
medical staff, the sector within the hospital that is the usual initiator of
CON proposals.
Once emergency situations have been exempted, a legislative re-
quirement that projects first be cited in plans on file with the CON
reviewers should easily withstand constitutional challenge.'55  Absent
an express grant of legislative authority, rulemaking efforts on this mat-
ter may even be sustainable as consistent with the general intent of
CON to ensure the reasonable development of a state's health care sys-
tem. Additional legal authority for such rulemaking efforts can be
found in those state CON laws containing language dealing with re-
153. See, e.g., National Nephrology Foundation v. Dougherty, 138 N.J. Super. 470, 351 A.2d
392 (1976); Saint Joseph's Hosp. v. Finley, 153 N.J. Super. 214, 379 A.2d 467 (1977), cert. denied,
75 N.J. 595,384 A.2d 825 (1978). The proposed New York regulations, § 710.1 l(a), Subchapter C,
Chapter V, Title 10 (Health) of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the
State of New York establish review periods for project types whereby specific projects may be
considered only during a limited time in a year. For example, all hospital tertiary service projects
may be heard only from January to April of each year. This constraint on scheduling obviously
leads to a batching of like projects, allowing for a comparative analysis of their merits, including
quality, accessibility and costs. See also Bio-Medical Applications of Clearwater, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Health & Rehabilitative Services, [1979] 3 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
29,559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1979) (failure of CON agency to consolidate and conduct
comparative hearing for two opposing bona fide, timely and mutually exclusive applications for
the establishment of kidney dialysis facilities in the same area was material procedural error, case
remanded).
154. See, e.g., Massachusetts Department of Health, supra note 150, at 2.
155. See the discussion of North Carolina ex rel Morrow Y. Caifano, supra note 149.
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view criteria that reference a project's conformity with the long-range
plans of health care institutions.
D. Of Appro vals-Partial and Conditional
It is not uncommon for CON applicants to present for review mul-
tifaceted projects that may entail both new equipment and construc-
tion, include several different service areas, or contain a mix of new
services and building renovation projects. Frequently, these projects
may be completed in stages extending over several years. Such propos-
als tend to carry a high price tag, and not uncommonly, they may in-
clude some components that are meritorious and others that are of
dubious value. The common response by CON reviewers to such
projects is to seek to identify as early in the process as possible those
components that are of questionable utility and negotiate with the ap-
plicant to have these deleted.
The capability to negotiate reductions in project scope tends to
vary with the nature of the proposal, the credibility of the CON review-
ers, the project's importance to the applicant, and frequently, the likely
outcome if the compromise is rejected. Under the present system, it is
always the applicant who has the power to determine whether to com-
promise or to proceed with the original proposal. When negotiations
fail, in whole or in part, the CON decisionmaker must then make the
difficult decision whether the good points of the proposal sufficiently
outweigh the bad to warrant the recommendation or granting of an
approval. Politically, as well as technically, such decisions are exceed-
ingly difficult, for saying no requires denying a proposal with some, if
not many, significant merits.
To respond to these dilemmas, the Wisconsin legislature recently
passed amendments to its CON law that authorize the state CON deci-
sionmakers to render partial approvals. 56 The authority to approve
some aspects of a project while rejecting others provides the CON re-
viewers with a significant tool, albeit one that may be double-edged.
On the positive side, the reviewers need not wait passively for the ap-
plicant to decide whether or not to negotiate. Furthermore, under the
prevailing system, once the applicant does agree to participate in nego-
tiations, the burden tends to shift to the reviewers to make a compara-
ble gesture by yielding on some of its demands for the project. Under a
Wisconsin-type scheme, the applicant can neither expect nor seek, ex-
156. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.06(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
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pressly or implicitly, any concession in the stringency of the review for
agreeing to negotiate. When the reviewers are empowered, with or
without the consent of the applicant, to reduce the scope of a project,
no such quidpro quo can be expected. Should a compromise prove
impossible, the CON reviewers can still approve the meritorious com-
ponents of the project without rejecting the entire proposal.
On the negative side, applicants may seek to overwhelm the CON
system by "trimming out the Christmas tree"r-filling CON proposals
with large numbers of components-some needed, some not-to force
the reviewers to search for, identify and approve necessary elements
while rejecting less meritorious components. A large portion of the re-
viewers' limited time could thus be spent in unproductive work. Also,
much of the present incentive to negotiate questionable aspects of CON
proposals could be dissipated if providers perceive that the negotiation
requirement has been replaced by a CON decisionmaking system that
provides for partial approval. This was one concern voiced by Wiscon-
sin state officials after they were given the new authority to grant par-
tial approvals. 57 At this time it is impossible to assess the full impact
of the new Wisconsin law.
Conditional approvals for CON are more commonplace, although
they are frequently not recognized as such. Whenever a CON proposal
is approved, the decision is based on representations found in the appli-
cation-for example, that X new beds will be established, that the oc-
cupancy rate will be eighty-five percent, that residents of three
contiguous counties will be served, or that a CAT scanner will be in-
stalled serving an average of Y patients per day at a cost of Z dollars
per scan. Such representations are an integral part of every CON ap-
plication and constitute a critical part of the record relied upon by the
CON decisionmaker and appellate review bodies. This is especially
true when competing applications are being evaluated concurrently,
when plans and standards to evaluate a new service have not been es-
tablished, or whenever there is uncertainty over such issues as the pro-
jected level of utilization, the accompanying patient charges, or the
geographical area to be served. In addition, frequently as an outgrowth
of negotiations with the CON reviewers, the applicant typically pledges
additional actions that go beyond the specific proposal undergoing re-
view-for example, that outreach efforts into indigent neighborhoods
157. Telephone conversation with Mark Knight of Wisconsin Division of Health, Department
of Health and Social Services, December 22, 1978.
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of rural communities will be initiated, or that an underutilized service
in the same institution will be scaled down or eliminated.
Such commitments and projections may be said to constitute the
conditions upon which the CON has been issued. It has been generally
held that the power to approve includes the power to condition that
approval, and the enforceability of these conditions has been upheld as
long as they are reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
statute.1 58 Problems arise in the CON system, however, because of
present inadequacies in assuring compliance with provider promises.
As noted earlier, post-award monitoring of CON approvals is virtually
nonexistent in most states. At the present time, neither Medicare nor
Medicaid collect the data to cross-check actual levels of utilization with
projected levels or to compare the amount of actual billed charges with
the charge estimates presented in the CON application. Private third-
158. The analysis of conditional CON approvals prepared by Colorado Assistant Attorney
General Frederick Yu is most instructive on this point. In a Memorandum to Colorado Health
Facilities Review Council (September 6, 1978), Mr. Yu, in reviewing the Colorado CON statute,
which was silent on the matter of conditional approvals, found strong authority for their issuance.
Courts have held in a number of cases that the power to approve includes the power
to condition that approval. In Southern Pacfc Co. v. Olympic [sic] Dredging Co., 260
U.S. 205 . . the Secretary of War had approved construction of a new railroad bridge
over a navigable river. The Secretary's approval was conditioned upon the removal of
the old bridge. The U.S. Supreme Court said:
That the Secretary of War was authorized to impose a condition heretofore quoted
does not admit of doubt. The power to approve implies the power to disapprove,
and the power to disapprove necessarily includes the lesser power to condition an ap-
proval. In the light of this general assumption by Congress of control over the sub-
ject and of the large powers delegated to the Secretary, the condition imposed by
that officer cannot be considered otherwise than as an authoritative determination
of what was reasonably necessary to be done to insure free and safe navigation so
far as the obstruction in question was concerned.
(emphasis added) 260 U.S. at 208.
It is worth noting that some courts have struck down conditions attached to varied
forms of licensure. For example, in New York University v. Temporary State Housing
Rent Commission, 304 N.Y. 126, 106 N.E.2d 44 (1952), the plaintiff University sought to
evict a tenant to recover a building for use as a dormitory. The Rent Commission, as a
condition to the issuance of a certificate of eviction, required the University, as the land-
lord, to relocate the evicted tenants. The court found that nothing in the statute or regu-
lations authorized the Commission to impose such a condition, and that the condition
was therefore unlawful. ...
Whenever the Council wishes to impose a condition upon the issuance of a certifi-
cate, it must inquire whether the condition is "reasonably necessary to effectuate the
purposes, scope, or stated terms" of the Certificate of Public Necessity Act. Where the
Council finds such reasonable necessity, and does impose a condition, it would be worth-
while practice for the Council to make specific findings as to the basis for its decision to
impose a condition, the reasonable necessity of the condition, and how the condition
effectuates the purposes, scope or stated terms of the Act.
Id. at 2-3. Mr. Yu's analysis was based on the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act, which is
comparable to the administrative procedure acts enacted in most other states; consequently, his
analysis is applicable to many state-enacted CON programs.
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party payors also do not look for these discrepancies. CON reviewers
themselves do not customarily monitor projects after the award, gener-
ally having neither the inclination nor the resources.
Furthermore, once significant deviations from the original applica-
tion have been found, it is not at all clear whether suitable remedies are
available to CON reviewers or other parties. Absent the intentional
filing of erroneous information, rescission of the CON itself would be
extremely difficult, especially since CON statutes are generally silent on
this point. It is also unlikely that courts would favor so drastic a pen-
alty. Civil fines might be possible, but again specific statutory authority
is lacking in virtually all CON laws. Discounting future CON pro-
posals filed by the offending applicant might be attempted informally,
but again, lacking statutory authorization, a CON agency may not be
empowered to sanction providers in this manner. With change fre-
quently outpacing the best of projections in the current health care in-
dustry, fraud or bad faith is exceedingly difficult to prove when
discrepancies appear.
The best opportunity for both oversight and assuring compliance
with the promises of a CON application lies with a prospective hospital
budgeting system, most particularly with a state hospital ratesetting
commission. Such commissions are generally bound to recognize CON
projects in their hospital rate setting efforts.' 59 In some states, how-
ever-most notably Maryland-this has resulted in an element of ri-
valry, if not bad feelings, between the CON and planning staff and
their cost-conscious, budget-watching colleagues in the state hospital
commission.1 60 Nonetheless, through the use of this financial mecha-
nism, a hospital could be held to comply with the specific charges,
utilization figures, or purchase price proposed and approved in its
CON application. The hospital commission would simply recognize
only those costs that would have derived from the projections in the
approved application-for example, the unapproved additional costs of
a construction project would be excluded from the rate base. If actual
utilization levels were lower than those projected, the higher unit costs
would similarly be disallowed.' 6' The material representations made
159. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.9-106(3)(c)(IV) (1978) (forces the hospital commis-
sion to recognize for a minimum of three years the full costs of a project that has received CON
approval).
160. See H. Cohen, supra note 97.
161. Because of the high ratio of fixed to variable costs in most areas of the health sector, not
allowing a hospital to raise its per unit charges when utilization is lower than expected and when
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in the final (approved) version of the CON application could be bind-
ing for a minimum period such as three years-whether the commit-
ment was made on the initiative of the provider, elicited by the CON
reviewers, or was prompted by the competitive pressures arising out of
a "batched" application format.
1 62
It may be appropriate before taking remedial action-whether
through a ratesetting mechanism or through other means-to apply a
screen or test to the provider who might simply have erred in complet-
ing its CON application. One criterion should be whether the errone-
ous information was material to the deliberations-that is, did the
reviewers and other interested parties rely on it to such an extent that
the project's evaluation might have been different had the correct infor-
mation been provided. To return to our earlier example, how impor-
tant was it that the applicant indicated that it would be serving three
counties rather than two? If, given the specific facts of the case, it is
judged not significant by the CON decisionmaker, then the error could
be excused. Nonetheless, there could be a cumulative effect of small
mistakes that totally distorts the merit of a project or raises legitimate
concerns about the competence of the party filling out the application
forms. Ultimately, the integrity of a regulatory mechanism is
threatened by erroneous information supplied to the decisionmaker-
regardless of whether the source of the mistake was negligence or bad
faith.
The other criterion that should be used is whether the inability to
comply with the representations in the application resulted from cir-
cumstances clearly outside the control of the provider-if for example,
a radiologist expected to join the hospital staff and run the CAT scan-
ner was delayed at his earlier post and came to the hospital six months
late, resulting in the machine being utilized for this period at a rate
substantially below projections. Of course, even if the provider is
charges had been calculated on a higher, more optimistic utilization rate may constitute a con-
siderable financial disincentive to the facility.
162. See, e.g., National Nephrology Foundation v. Dougherty, 138 N.J. Super. 470, 351 A.2d
392 (1976). In besting two other applicants, the successful applicant agreed to a condition sought
by the CON decisionmaker-that it operate the renal dialysis center in "cooperation" with the
local hospital, which also happened to be one of the rejected applicants. Id. at 475, 351 A.2d at
395.
In states where there is no prospective rate setting mechanism, other remedies will have to be
examined, although none is likely to be as satisfactory as the one just described. A system of
graduated civil fines is one possibility. See Butler, Assuring the Quality of Care andLife in Nursing
Homes: The Dilemma of Enforcement, this Symposium, at text accompanying notes 209-45. Par-
tial rescission of the CON is another.
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found to be free of fault, some changes in the nature of a project may
be significant enough that they should be brought back to the CON
reviewing agency for further disposition.
A recent Colorado case involving a 400 bed hospital in Denver
illustrates this point well.' 63 The facility applied for and received a
CON in March 1976 to obtain a CAT scanner for $450,000. The hospi-
tal found after receiving the CON that the machine it had in mind
would cost $520,000, including installation. When the hospital sent its
radiologists and neurologists to both the manufacturer's plant and a
large medical center utilizing the machine, they discovered that it failed
to meet specifications and would not serve the hospital's needs satisfac-
torily. The hospital cancelled its order and began to investigate other
machines, all of which were found lacking. Finally the facility discov-
ered a "third generation" scanner that had not even been introduced
when the hospital first obtained its CON. More than a year after the
CON was obtained, the hospital ordered the scanner, even though it
cost $700,000 and even though CONs in Colorado were effective for
not more than twelve months."6 When the Colorado CON agency
learned of these activities, it sought additional clarifying information.
The hospital went to court seeking injunctive relief from any proposed
action by the state to block the hospital's acquisition, installation and
utilization of the scanner. The state court, without ruling on the merits,
found that the hospital would suffer irreparable injury-though it did
not indicate how-if the hospital could not immediately use its newly
delivered but still unpacked scanner. The court granted the hospital's
request, and the scanner began full operations.
The major importance of the case is not whether the hospital was
at fault for ordering a defective brand of CAT scanner-in the area of
new medical technology, models are rapidly being superseded. Rather
the issue is whether the hospital should have fully disclosed its difficul-
ties to the CON decisionmaker and obtained its consent to exceed the
approved price estimate by fifty percent and the twelve-month statu-
tory limit for incurring a binding obligation.
163. St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Colorado Dep't of Health, No. C76578 (Denver Dist. Ct. Feb. 6,
1978).
164. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-3-509(1) (1973).
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E. One Bite at the Apple: The Relevance of the Doctrines of Res
Judicata and Substantial Evidence for CON
Decisionmaking
With CON approval rates nationally in the ninety-percent range,
it may seem premature to discuss reforms designed to assure that the
CON system is not flooded with rehearings and extensive appeal hear-
ings regarding projects that have been rejected after a full administra-
tive proceeding. Nonetheless, if the stringency of the CON system does
increase-as its boosters assert is not only likely but presently occur-
ring 65mthen the number of projects that will be denied is likely to
increase markedly. This projected increase in rejections will undoubt-
edly give rise not only to a surge in appeals, but also to the develop-
ment of "new" projects that will be nothing more than reworked
versions of an already rejected project, with only cosmetic or trivial
differences. These tactics are likely to be utilized primarily by wealth-
ier applicants for whom the cost of prosecuting a CON application is
relatively insignificant, especially since the costs of preparing an appli-
cation are recoverable from third-party payors, including Medicare and
Medicaid.
166
In the judicial system such "repeat" cases would likely be subject
to the principle of res judicata for reasons of system efficiency and
economy, certainty of outcome, and basic fairness, thus assuring that
all parties-regardless of wealth-get only one day in court, that the
adjudicatory system is not unduly taxed, and that the decisionmaking
system is dispositive of controversies brought before it with parties
barred from indulging in after-the-fact forum shopping. 67 In adminis-
trative adjudications, however, res judicata has been applied only nar-
rowly, governed by the factual identity of the specific matter.1
68
The traditional policy reasons for applying res judicata appear rel-
evant to CON cases. Consequently, as a general approach, subject to
discretionary exemptions, res judicata should be applied. In CON mat-
ters the significant facts and circumstances tend to be known and to be
165. See, e.g., Remarks of Joseph A. Califano, supra note 17, at 10; American Health Planning
Association report, supra note 37, at 3.
166. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 405.451(b)(2) (1978), which recognizes as reimbursable under
Medicare those "[n]ecessary and proper costs. . . which are appropriate and helpful in develop-
ing and maintaining the operation of patient care facilities and activities. They are usually costs
which are common and accepted occurrences in the field of the provider's activity."
167. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2 (2d ed. 1977).
168. K. DAVIS, ADMiNISTRATivE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 18.02 (1976).
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relatively constant. Review criteria and plans are increasingly common
for a growing number of services and projects and, at least for the short
run, are not likely to change. Thus, barring a showing of great and
unforeseen hardship, a project that has been considered and rejected by
CON reviewers should be barred from resubmission for a substantial
period of time, such as three years.1 69 After that period, conditions
may well have changed enough to justify a reexamination of the project
if it is resubmitted.
It is more difficult to establish a definite policy for once-rejected
CON projects that are resubmitted after being substantially modified or
economically scaled down. A subsequent proposal may be substan-
tially different from its predecessor even though it deals with the same
general subject matter. For example, suppose that a general hospital
has an underutilized wing that is licensed for use for general surgery
patients. Res judicata should not bar the hospital from submitting a
CON proposal to convert the wing from general surgery uses to general
rehabilitative care even if a CON had already been denied on the basis
of over-capacity in the community for an earlier CON application to
convert the wing into one designated for heart catheterization and car-
diac surgery. Little good to the public or the institution would be ac-
complished by freezing the wing's use for a period of time (perhaps as
long as three years), especially since, with the exception of New York
and Wisconsin where the power has never been exercised,170 states at
the present time are without the authority to decertify (that is, elimi-
nate) a hospital's service. The wing would, in all likelihood, be of little
value as an underutilized surgical area.
Another hypothetical, however, reveals the difficulty in devising a
general rule. Let us assume a hospital is seeking a CON for two mil-
lion dollars to construct a new wing to add twenty new intensive care
beds. It is rejected on the grounds that less expensive alternatives were
not explored. The facility then returns within six months with a project
estimated to cost one million dollars that would involve converting an
underutilized, already existing floor of the hospital into an intensive
care service for fifteen beds. Should consideration of this second pro-
posal be barred by res judicata?
169. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 100.109(c)(1)(iii) (1977) (three-year limitation in 1122 program).
170. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2806-a (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978). In Wisconsin the au-
thority to decertify is limited to six specialized services: heart catheterization or cardiac surgery,
radiation therapy, hemodialysis, kidney transplantation, intensive care and high risk neonatal
services, and CAT scanning. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.41 to .48 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
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The adverse consequences of rejecting for review a less ambitious
or less expensive version of an already rejected project could be consid-
erable. It could well discourage an applicant from pursuing a more
realistic approach in the first place. The incentive to settle for less, as
has been noted repeatedly in this article, is already small in the health
sector, especially for larger, wealthier providers. On the positive side,
erecting a bar of some kind to such modified CON projects could, for
appropriate projects, aid CON decisionmakers in achieving a mutually
acceptable compromise with a project's proponents. Determining when
to invoke such a bar and what the nature of it should be is worth fur-
ther consideration and perhaps some experimentation. Conceivably,
the bar should be applied whenever a new project deals with the same
subject and involves no additional services, but has a lower cost or
fewer beds. Or perhaps the bar should be an absolute one remaining in
effect for one year rather than three, or it should be a relative one in
which, operating under a capital expenditures lid, it would carry "pen-
alty points" of some kind that would detract from the project's priority
in obtaining an allocation of the state's annual budget for new capital
expenditures.
Similar considerations of economy, certainty and fairness should
also apply to the scope of appellate review rendered at both the admin-
istrative and judicial levels. Consequently, CON matters that have
been appealed should be subject to the substantial evidence rule, so
that review is limited to whether procedural due process was accorded,
whether the action taken was within the agency's authority, and
whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence in the
record. 
71
The courts appear to have been diligent in exercising the self-re-
straint necessary in applying the substantial evidence rule to CON
cases, although in several recent instances they have found the rule's
minimum requirements not to have been met and have reversed the
administrative decision resulting in the issuance of a CON. 7 2 The
defects in several of these cases were the same-there had been inade-
quate documentation in the record on why a specific standard had been
171. See Saint Joseph's Hosp. v. Finley, 153 N.J. Super. 214, 379 A.2d 467 (1978).
172. See North Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Office of Community Medical Facilities, 355 So. 2d 1272
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Northwest Hosp. v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Bd., 59 I11. App.
3d 221, 375 N.E.2d 1327 (1978).
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adopted,1 73 and the standard had apparently been applied inconsis-
tently to earlier applicants who, despite having violated the standard,
had nonetheless received a CON. 74  The record in each of these
cases failed to reflect what special merits these more fortunate appli-
cants possessed or how those earlier cases could otherwise be
distinguished.1
75
While it is true that the substantial evidence rule has traditionally
been applied to limit judicial review of final administrative action, it
also has applicability for administrative appellate bodies and the re-
views they conduct under current CON program requirements. After
reviews at the HSA (and in some cases, the sub-HSA) level and a re-
view and final administrative decision at the state level, there is still
under federal law an additional administrative review before a dis-
puted CON matter may be brought before the courts. 76 This addi-
tional step, which frequently has the potential for developing into a
second full hearing, 7 7 promotes neither economy, certainty nor fair-
ness. 17 8 Pennsylvania is presently seeking to amend its 1122 contract
with HEW to limit the scope of review of this administrative appeal to
bring it into accord with the judicial substantial evidence rule and, at a
173. See North Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Office of Community Medical Facilities, 355 So. 2d 1272
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
174. See id.; Northwest Hosp. v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Bd., 59 IIn. App. 3d 221,
375 N.E.2d 1327 (1978).
175. These recent judicial decisions regarding CON decisionmaking corroborate what Profes-
sor K.C. Davis noted in his recent work regarding the current status of general administrative law:
"Developing the record" has become the central issue for administrative law in the
1970s. The record thus becomes the critical point for assuring general political accounta-
bility to the public and the legislature and in providing the courts with the necessary
legal basis for exercising their limited review over administrative actions, including
rulemaking, rate setting and adjudication.
K. DAvis, supra note 168, at § 6.
176. 42 C.F.R. § 123.407(a)(9), (10) (1977) (CON requirements of P.L. 93-641); 42 C.F.R.
§ 106(c) (1977) (1122 requirements).
177. A hearing must be held at either the HSA or state level. 42 U.S.C. § 300n-l(b)(8) (1976).
178. See, e.g., Somers & Somers, supra note 42:
It is not easy to find a satisfactory balance between "due process," designed to pro-
vide maximum protection to the regulated parties, and administrative efficiency. In the
New Jersey situation, however, it appears that "due process" has been too closely identi-
fied with multiple layers of bureaucratic review.
. . . Equity does require that denied applicants have a right of appeal within the
administrative process. But such an appeal can rightly be confined to questions of "due
process" to assure that all rights under the law have been respected and proper proce-
dures have been followed. It does not require a complete reopening of all substantive
questions ....
Id. at 161. For a similar perspective from California, see S. Price, supra note 115, at 4: "In terms
of procedure, what the state lacks by way of regulatory bodies it makes up for by over-using what
it has. Everything is done twice."
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minimum, to bar additional testimony at this level.'79 At the time of
this writing, this approach has not been approved by HEW. Such lim-
its on administrative appeals seem nonetheless advisable.
F Keeping Future "CATs" in the Bag. The Case for Time-Limited or
Site-Limited Moratoria for New Technology
In the aftermath of the CAT scanner phenomenon, with its explo-
sive introduction, its short-lived generations of equipment, and the lin-
gering questions about its efficacy, 180 one fact emerges clearly-with a
new invention, it could all happen again. The forces that push provid-
ers toward embracing proliferating technology are, if anything,
stronger than ever,18 and the capability of the overseers of the health
system-the third-party payors, the planners and the regulators-to re-
spond adequately to the next technological breakthrough remains min-
imal. Specifically, the staff of CON agencies, HSAs and SHPDAs, such
as planners, statisticians; administrators and financial analysts, lack the
resources and the training to conduct studies and analyze results on the
effectiveness, efficacy and safety of new medical equipment. Incentives
continue to exist for hospitals to compete among themselves not on the
basis of price but largely through offering status and convenience (mea-
sured in part by providing the latest in medical technology) to its medi-
cal staff.'8 2  Like other Americans, especially those with scientific
training, many physicians continue to be intrigued with gadgetry and
interested in labor-saving devices. Furthermore, physicians are con-
cerned about malpractice and their potential liability if they fail to pro-
vide their patients with the latest in diagnostic and therapeutic services.
The advent of the new technology assessment capability in the Of-
fice of the Assistant Secretary of Health'83 and the increased activities
of the Office of Technology Assessment in Congress, together with uni-
versity-based research efforts into the subject, may begin to provide the
basis for reviewing new technology before its massive introduction into
the field. It has been estimated that forty percent of the increase in
179. See Proposed Rule § 8.14 (Scope of the fair hearing) in 8 PA. BULL. 452-53, 2305-06
(1976).
180. See .OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 100.
181. See, e.g., authorities cited note 102 supra. See also H. Cohen supra note 97, at 7 (finan-
cial incentives to health institutions to lease new medical equipment for short periods rather than
purchase it outright).
182. See Nelson & Winter, supra note 140.
183. Health Services Research, Health Statistics, and Health Care Technology Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-623, 92 Stat. 3443 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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hospital costs is a result of the introduction of new technology; if so,
then for CON and other cost-containment mechanisms to succeed, a
strategy for handling technology must be developed. This strategy
must include analyzing, compiling and publishing research already
performed on new technology, the funding of clinical trials and other
methodologies that study the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of
new equipment and procedures, and researching the technology devel-
opment industry as well as the receptivity of health providers to new
technology. Such research is necessary first to understand and then to
influence the development, the deployment, and ultimately the use of
technology in the health care sector. These issues must receive national
attention. The work cannot be handled piecemeal without an overall
coordinating point.
CON agencies must learn how to monitor closely the work of these
national research projects and establish checks on the deployment of
new technology until adequate evidence has been collected and evalu-
ated on the usefulness of the projects. A limited moratorium may pro-
vide the best basis for evaluating some kinds of technology. By setting
up one site in a state or region for public use of the new technology, the
service can be made available on a limited, experimental basis while
the usefulness of the technology is being fully examined. Alternately, a
time-limited moratorium could be imposed, precluding any introduc-
tion of the technology into the state until evidence has been collected
nationally showing it to be safe, efficient and medically cost-effective.
Precedents exist to support moratoria for planning and CON pur-
poses;'8 4 however, several recent state court decisions suggest that it is
questionable whether a moratorium could be imposed without formal
rulemaking procedures.185 Furthermore, to establish the prima facie
reasonableness of the regulation, the agency should clearly set forth in
the rulemaking hearing the purposes it hopes to serve by enacting the
moratorium and the procedure to be utilized to review CON applica-
tions for the service in question.' 8 6
184. See Cooper River Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Dougherty, 133 N.J. Super. 226, 336 A.2d
35 (1975).
185. See North Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Office of Community Medical Facilities, 355 So. 2d
1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Cooper-River Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Dougherty, 133 N.J.
Super. 226, 336 A.2d 35 (1975).
186. See Cooper River Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Dougherty, 133 N.J. Super. 226, 336 A.2d
35 (1975).
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CONCLUSION
The solutions proposed in this article to strengthen the CON sys-
tem are admittedly wide-ranging, eclectic, and in some areas, perhaps
radical. The proposed remedies all tend to require greater intervention,
but they are not merely premised on the assumption that all aspects of
the health care industry should be brought under regulatory scrutiny
and control. Several proposals were designed to bring efficiency, ac-
countability and initiative to the CON mechanism. Others were aimed
at stimulating market forces in the health care system and diffusing
political opposition to sound but locally unpopular CON decisions.
Some approaches sought to raise the consciousness level of parochial
providers and consumers alike while protecting the right to due process
of all interested parties. Finally, options were proposed to allow the
system to function-or at least "muddle through"-until the quality
and availability of health information, plans and criteria can be
improved.
CON cannot be the panacea for the inflation that now ails the
health care system. The roots of the problem are too numerous and too
ingrained in our entire economy to be addressed by any single ap-
proach. CON is, at best, only a tactical device. Efforts to reform CON
cannot take the place of efforts to develop a national health policy.
However a national health policy is formulated-whether through the
marketplace, centralized planning, or some mixture of both-it must
establish priorities for the nation's health care system. We must seek to
obtain better value for our current health expenditures. CON, together
with other tools, may prove useful in administering priorities, eliminat-
ing waste and redundancy, and giving us better value for our health
dollar.
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